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ABSTRACT	  
Since	  1994,	  approximately	  three	  million	  homes	  have	  been	  built	   for	   lower	   income	  households	   in	  South	  
Africa,	   but	   as	   a	   result	   of	   population	   growth,	   immigration,	   increasing	   urbanization	   and	   systemic	  
inefficiencies,	  such	  as	  corruption,	  the	  backlog	  of	  formal	  housing	  units	  stands	  at	  almost	  1.5	  million.	  	  This	  
persistent	  unmet	  need	  for	  low-­‐income	  and	  affordable	  housing	  is	  putting	  tremendous	  pressure	  on	  South	  
African	  leaders	  to	  more	  efficiently	  implement	  the	  policies	  they	  have	  created	  and	  take	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  
this	  decades	  old	  problem.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  South	  African	  
affordable	  housing	  market	  and	  the	   factors	   that	  are	  contributing	  to	  the	  chasm	  that	  exists	  between	  the	  
demand	  for	  affordable	  housing	  and	  the	  limited	  supply	  of	  stock	  in	  this	  sector	  of	  the	  market.	   	  The	  study	  
focuses	   on	   four	   major	   drivers	   –	   three	   can	   be	   considered	   conventional	   market	   drivers	   and	   are	   land	  
reform,	   construction	   processes	   and	   technology	   and	   access	   to	   financing.	   	   The	   fourth	   driver	   is	   an	  
unconventional	  but	  significant	   factor	  and	  that	   is,	  corruption	  and	   its	  economic	  and	  societal	   impact.	   	  Of	  
these	   four	   issues	   the	  most	  critical	  are	   land	  reform,	  due	  to	  well-­‐designed	  but	  poorly	  executed	  policies,	  
and	  corruption	  due	  to	  its	  profound	  impact	  on	  the	  affordable	  housing	  market.	  	  	  
	  
The	  seeming	  inability	  of	  the	  South	  African	  government	  to	  make	  effective	  progress	  in	  meeting	  the	  
extreme	  shortfall	  in	  housing	  for	  lower	  income	  populations	  is	  leading	  to	  increased	  incidences	  of	  
undeveloped,	  well-­‐located	  land	  being	  informally	  settled,	  and	  is	  creating	  unrest	  in	  the	  population	  and	  
political	  instability.	  	  This	  thesis	  discusses	  the	  discrete	  challenges	  within	  the	  land,	  construction	  and	  
finance	  sectors,	  with	  special	  attention	  given	  to	  the	  industry-­‐wide	  crippling	  force	  of	  corruption,	  which	  
was	  uncovered	  during	  in-­‐person	  interviews	  with	  South	  African	  developers,	  businessmen,	  educators	  and	  
students.	  	  The	  author	  outlines	  potential	  solutions	  to	  mitigate	  corruption’s	  impact	  through	  strengthened	  
eradication	  efforts	  combined	  with	  economic	  approaches	  based	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  double	  
marginalization.	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1 | INTRODUCTION 
“Protection from the elements, privacy and security are fundamental for 
human survival, dignity and social stability. The history of forced removals, 
shack clearances, sterile dormitory communities, mass hostels and 
inadequate services (‘toilets in the veld’) helps to explain…the priority 
given to building houses after the end of apartheid.” 
~Ivan Turok, Towards Resilient Cities: The State of South African Cities 2011 
 
The first fully democratic election held in South Africa 19 years ago, which resulted in 
Nelson Mandela becoming president, was an historic occasion not only because an 
African became president but because the transition to ‘post-apartheid’ went so 
peacefully – thanks in large part to the leadership of Mr. Mandela.  To the world it 
marked the official end of apartheid and the dawn of an inclusive, non-race based 
society.  In South Africa, the new leaders faced a very complex social situation:  
centuries of forced relocation and dispossession of Africans, which resulted in 
pronounced inequalities between races in terms of land ownership, income distribution, 
education, skills, and healthcare.   
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa guarantees the right to adequate 
housing for all South Africans.  At the end of apartheid there was one formal house for 
every 3.5 Whites, while the ratio for Africans was one formal house for every 43.  The 
population in 1996 was just over 40.5 million with 76% of the population African. (Knight 
2001)  That translates, roughly, to 717,000 formal homes for 30.8 million Africans.  Using 
an average household size of five people (Ibid.), there was an approximate deficit of 
seven million formal housing units needed to meet the demand that existed in the mid-
1990’s. 
 
Since 1994, approximately three million homes have been built for lower income 
households, but with population growth, immigration and increasing urbanization the 
backlog of formal housing units stands at almost 1.5 million, which puts the number of 
South Africans in need of formal housing at 7.5 million. (“Census 2011: Methodology and 
Highlights of Key Results” 2012)  This persistent unmet need for low-income and 
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affordable housing is putting tremendous pressure on South African leaders to more 
efficiently implement the policies they have designed and take a new approach to this 
decades old problem.  Since the end of apartheid, which created these inequalities, 
the political system and the policies implemented therein have not been effective in 
channeling resources toward housing for the poor, which, along with land reform, was 
and remains a top priority for South Africa’s leaders.   
 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop an understanding of the South African affordable 
housing market, primarily in the province of KwaZulu-Natal1, and the factors that are 
contributing to the chasm that exists between the demand for affordable housing and 
the limited supply of stock and financing options in this sector of the market.  The study 
focuses on four major drivers – three can be considered conventional market drivers 
and are land reform, construction processes and technology and access to financing.  
The fourth driver is an unconventional but significant factor and that is, corruption and 
its economic and societal impact.  Of these four issues the most critical, in the author’s 
view, are land reform, due to well-intentioned but poorly executed policies, and 
corruption due to its far-reaching impact on the housing market and the economy as a 
whole. 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA AND APARTHEID 
South Africa has a painful and complex history of clashes between its original 
populations (Khoikhoi, San2, and Bantu-speaking groups that migrated from northern 
border areas) and European settlers (primarily Dutch and British), as well as violent 
battles between the British and Dutch-speaking Boers 3 .  Acts of aggression and 
oppression visited upon native Africans by the Boers and British became progressively 
worse over the centuries.   
 
                                                
1 I will at times make reference to South Africa as a whole; to the province of KwaZulu-Natal, which is one of 
the nine provinces that make up South Africa; and to eThekwini, which is the metropolitan municipality 
within KwaZulu-Natal that includes the major urban center of Durban and its shipping port. 
2 In regard to the Khoikhoi and the San, Clark and Worger state that “all are now viewed by scholars as 
having a common origin and are referred to as the ‘Khoisan’ peoples.”(Clark and Worger 2011, 11) 
3 Battles and wars between the British and Dutch-speaking colonists and settlers were actually fought, on 
both sides, by all races.  However, the treaties and unions that ended each conflict were written by and for 
the exclusive benefit of Europeans. 
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Beginning in 1652, the Dutch East India Company established a settlement in the Cape 
area and not long after began violently forcing the Khoi off of their land and claiming it 
for themselves.  The land that was taken from the Khoi was turned into large 
commercial farms, staffed with slave labor from Angola and West Africa, and run by 
European settlers.  The Khoi are now all but extinct having had their numbers greatly 
reduced by the wars waged against them and having fallen victim to epidemics of 
smallpox.  These factors along with male European settlers procreating with Khoi 
women have eliminated most of these original South African inhabitants.   
 
The ensuing years brought British occupation of the Cape, twice.  In 1807 the British 
banned the slave trade, and in 1834 they emancipated the slaves in the Cape.  Many 
of Dutch-speaking Boers, already frustrated by British policies, felt emancipating slaves 
was the last straw.  Determined to establish their own settlements free from British rule, 
more than 12,000 Boers left the Cape and headed inland beyond the borders of British 
rule.  This became known as The Great Trek and is considered a foundational moment 
in the history of Afrikaners.  As the Boers moved inland they continued the violent taking 
of lands from the Khoisan.  This had economic impacts for the native populations who 
had developed active among themselves “with cultivators and pastoralists developing 
complementary economies.” (Clark and Worger 2011, 11) 
 
Up until the early 1800’s, South Africa was not a large economic power.  The agricultural 
system was not producing lucrative export crops, but primarily crops for self-sufficiency.  
The historical shift in the South African economy, and a major economic driver for 
institutionalizing the oppression of non-Whites, came with the discovery of diamonds 
and gold in 1869 and 1886 respectively.  Maximizing profits in the diamond and gold 
mines required ensuring a large, cheap and unskilled labor pool. 
 
Those that had claims on land, known as Diggers4, and were in search of diamonds 
found the cost of labor versus the productivity (i.e., the success rate of finding enough 
diamonds to at least break even) to be unsustainable.  Since there was no formal way 
                                                
4 A person that held a claim, or exclusive rights, on a piece of land in order to dig for diamonds was called 
a “Digger,” even though the claim owners were not the ones doing the actual digiging. 
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to enforce the labor contracts between Diggers and laborers, the laborers would come 
and go from the work sites without notice.  The unpredictability of the laborers, coupled 
with the laborer’s ability to earn a living wage via agricultural pursuits back on their 
family- or tribe-owned land created a shortage of cheap, dependable (read 
controllable) laborers.  The laborers were also accused of stealing some of the 
diamonds they found, which, from the Diggers’ view, only created more of an 
imbalance in the labor versus productivity equation.  These factors, the claim owners 
argued, drove up the cost of labor and they drafted what would become the first Pass 
Laws5 in order to increase the supply (by restricting the laborers ability to leave the 
area) and control the movements of Black laborers within the mining area (there were 
curfews and any laborer could be stopped at any time and had to present his pass 
book for verification or be subject to fines, flogging and/or imprisonment).   
 
The years between 1911 – 1945 saw a multitude of laws passed further entrenching 
race-based segregation and oppression, culminating in 1948 when a group of laws 
would be passed that made apartheid the law of the land.  Africans, from the very 
beginning, protested these laws in every manner available – through attempted civil 
discourse, through the legal system, by organized political protests and eventually 
violence.  Nelson Mandela became a major force in the anti-apartheid fight and in the 
1963 Rivonia Trial, he and seven other ANC leaders were sentenced to life imprisonment 
for treason. 
 
The violence escalated, as did the Afrikaner-led apartheid government’s efforts to 
enforce ever more restrictions on the Black majority.  While South Africa was throwing its 
weight into enforcing race-based oppression, the United States was moving in the 
opposite direction with the Civil Rights Movement.  It would take another two decades, 
but international pressure and economic embargoes in the 1980s finally took a deep 
                                                
5 The Pass Laws instituted in 1872 required migrant workers to register their work contracts at a newly 
established Labor Registry.  There were three types of passes: A temporary pass issued to a worker 
searching for work, a pass for a worker under contract, a pass to leave the area only if the contract had 
been fulfilled and the worker searched to ensure they weren’t stealing any diamonds.  The enforcement of 
the Pass Laws could be violent as some infractions were punished with flogging. 
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enough toll on the South African economy that a move away from apartheid became 
a matter of survival.   
 
Prior to Nelson Mandela’s release from prison in 1990, then president J.W. de Klerk 
began secret negotiations to transfer political power and dismantle apartheid.  A high-
ranking White businessman, who was born and raised in the KwaZulu-Natal area and a 
lifelong anti-apartheid sympathizer, noted during an interview that there were deals 
made with Blacks – those considered elite – to transfer up to a 25% business share of 
some of the largest companies in South Africa.  These deals were done to ensure that 
after the transfer of political power, these elite Black businessmen would ensure a 
‘favorable environment’ for the White-owned corporations.  There was a transfer of 
political power, but not economic power.  This came up as a bone of contention and 
source of frustration among many of the college students interviewed. 
 
By 1994, apartheid laws had been repealed and South Africa held it’s first non-racial 
democratic election.  Faced with the daunting task of righting the wrongs done over 
centuries, the governing ANC with Nelson Mandela at its helm crafted a new 
Constitution and set about enacting laws to move South Africa toward a more 
economically equitable society.  In subsequent elections, Thabo Mbeki and then Jacob 
Zuma became president and their successes have been, some say, unevenly balanced 
with a slew of charges and allegations of corrupt and self-serving decisions.6 
 
There is no doubt that the plight of many has been improved since 1994, especially 
when it comes to the relative and absolute numbers concerning education.  The 1996 
census indicated that >4 million people had had no schooling, which represented 
nearly 10% of the population.  In 2011, that figure had fallen to 2.7 million, a relative 
drop of 4.8 percentage points.  The housing figures are mixed – between 1996 and 2011 
there was a relative drop in the percentage of South Africans living in what is defined as 
                                                
6 For an in-depth, first-hand account of how the ANC changed beginning with the election of Thabo 
Mbeki, see “After the Party,” by Andrew Feinstein, which details a massive and complex arms deal that was 
an international scandal. 
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informal housing7, however, the absolute number increased:  16.6% down to 14.5%, but 
an absolute increase from 6.7 million to 7.5 million.  These numbers can be explained by 
the rate of urbanization that occurred after the end of apartheid as illustrated in the 
chart below. 
 
 
 
Even with the momentous event of South Africa hosting the World Cup in 2010, the 
country and its leaders still have a massive challenge on their hands.  In 2011 there were 
7.5 million South Africans still without formal housing, with almost one million of that 
number living in KwaZulu-Natal.8 
 
                                                
7 “Informal Housing” is defined in the Census as a makeshift structure not approved by a local authority 
and not intended as a permanent dwelling.  Typically built with found materials (corrugated iron, 
cardboard, plastic, etc.  “Other” housing, which the author has included in the “Informal Housing” 
numbers, is defined as tents or caravans.(“Census 2011: Methodology and Highlights of Key Results” 2012) 
 
8 Due to the legacy of apartheid’s race-based laws that had White supremacy and benefit at their heart, it 
is common to discuss most challenges in South Africa in terms of race. However, the author has chosen not 
to break down housing, poverty or education statistics by race because it is, in the author’s opinion, not 
material. Living in abject poverty with few, if any, opportunities for relief is inhumane regardless of race, 
gender, religious affiliation, etc. 
FIGURE 1.1 
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             Photograph by: Thomas Ziegler 2 Feb 07. Informal settlement, KZN 
  
This informal settlement is 
located in an area that 
used to be covered in 
vegetation but was 
cleared by the settlers. The 
settlement has no formal 
supply of electricity and 
any electricity in the shacks 
has been illegally obtained 
by splicing into nearby 
services. 
 
There are likely little to no 
water or toilet facilities. 
Limited water facilities may 
be provided through a 
manual pump (limited 
number of pumps for the 
entire settlement). Toilet 
facilities, if any, could be 
rudimentary pit latrines, 
otherwise residents will use 
adjacent fields to relieve 
themselves. 
 
The map image (from 
Bing.com and marked up 
by author) shows where the 
settlement is located and 
the surrounding, middle 
class single-family homes – 
in some areas, the shacks 
abut the fences of the 
formal homes. 
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www.bbc.co.uk/scotland/education/ms/southafrica/political/constitution/structure.shtml 
CONTEXT: POLITICS AND POLICY 
The Structure of South Africa’s Government 
South Africa is officially the Republic of South Africa and is “a constitutional democracy 
with a government and independent judiciary, all operating under a parliamentary 
system.” (Siyabona Africa 2013)   
 
  
 
The Cabinet consists of the President, Deputy President and Department Ministers, such 
as the Minister for the Department of Human Settlements.9  The Parliament consists of 
the National Assembly (400 members, elected by proportional representation) and the 
National Council of Provinces (10 members from each of the nine provinces, selected 
by the provincial legislative body).  The scope of the National government is broad 
policy, legislation and inter-provincial issues.   
 
Each Province has its own Provincial Government that consists of 30 – 80 members that 
are elected by proportional representation.  KwaZulu-Natal has 80 members and is 
dominated by the ANC who holds 51 of the 80 seats.  Provincial governments have the 
right to draft their own Constitutions, provided nothing in a Provincial Constitution 
conflicts with the country’s Constitution.  Provincial legislature is bound only by the 
national Constitution, as well as the Provincial constitution if it has one.  Provinces have 
the power to pass legislation in regard to the functional areas outlined in the national 
                                                
9 A complete list of the 34 Departments and associated Ministers can be found in the Appendices. 
FIGURE 1.2 
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Constitution.10  Provincial governments have the power to assign any of their legislative 
powers to a municipality within their area. (Grootboom 2000) 
 
eThekwini is designated as a Metropolitan Municipality11, which means it is not made up 
of a group of local municipalities but is a large district unto itself.  The eThekwini Metro 
Municipality includes the major urban center of Durban and the large Durban shipping 
port.  eThekwini’s government consists of a 205-member Council, which is elected by 
proportional representation, a Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Speaker.  The 205-member 
council elects the Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Speaker.  The official website for the 
Municipality states that the Municipal government “serves to facilitate the provision of 
infrastructure, services and support to the people of eThekwini.” (eThekwini Municipality 
2013) 
 
South Africa’s efforts to include and represent its ancient tribes within a modern 
democracy are done so through Provincial and National Houses of Traditional Leaders.  
The Constitution of South Africa set up six Provincial Houses of Traditional Leaders, which 
are located in Eastern Cape, Free State, North West, Mpumalanga, Limpopo and 
KwaZulu-Natal and advise Provincial governments on matters affecting traditional laws 
and customs.  Each Provincial House nominates three members to the National House, 
which advises the National Government “on the rights of communities in areas where 
traditional customs and laws still hold sway.” (British Broadcasting Corporation 2004) 
 
Politics 
Since 1994, the political landscape in South Africa has been fairly consistent in terms of 
political parties with the major parties being the ANC, DA, SACP, COPE and the IFP.  
Since Nelson Mandela’s retirement in 1999 the ANC, in particular, has undergone 
internal turmoil and, as Andrew Feinstein lamented, “has plummeted into a moral abyss” 
and is “[b]arely recognizable from the organization led by Mandela, Tambo and 
                                                
10 Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution have lengthy lists of functional areas of concurrent and exclusive 
legislative competence for National-Provincial-Local governments. (“Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996”) These functional areas span from slaughterhouse oversight and animal control to 
infrastructure and climate change policy. 
11 The two other types of municipalities are District and Local, where a District Municipality is comprised of a 
group of Local Municipalities and they work together to govern. 
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Luthuli…” (Feinstein 2009).  This seeming break with the stated guiding principles of the 
ANC has caused an increasing distrust of the ANC and pockets of political instability.   
 
There are daily reports across multiple media outlets alleging the ANC’s ineffective 
leadership, corrupt activities and overall dissatisfaction of the population that feel they 
are only slightly better off in a post-apartheid South Africa.  And although the ANC is the 
dominant governing party, there are a multitude of political party options – and these 
groups are gaining ground on the ANC with each election.  Following are the parties 
that are considered the major players in South African politics. 
 
African National Congress (ANC):  The ANC, originally called the South African Native 
National Congress, was formed in 1912 to unite South Africans in the struggle for 
freedom.  On December 16, 1961 in response to rising violence against blacks, but 
especially the Sharpeville Massacre12, the military wing of the ANC was launched, 
known as Umkhonto weSizwe (MK).  Nelson Mandela was President of the ANC from 
1991 to 1997.  The ANC was the primary anti-apartheid political movement and it was 
the secret meetings between a still-jailed Nelson Mandela and then President of South 
Africa, F.W. de Klerk, that paved the way for the eventual dismantling of apartheid.  The 
ANC still brands itself as “South Africa’s National Liberation Movement” and features 
Nelson Mandela on its homepage. (“African National Congress” 2013)  The ANC has 
been the governing party since the first democratic elections in 1994, although the 
percentage by which it wins each election has been steadily decreasing.  
 
Democratic Alliance (DA):  “The Democratic Alliance is the result of many parties and 
movements coming together over the years…” beginning in 1959 and culminating in 
2000 with the official launch of the DA. (“About the Democratic Alliance” 2013)  The DA 
is the official opposition party to the ANC. 
 
                                                
12 The Sharpeville Massacre occurred on March 21, 1960 in the Sharpeville Township in Gauteng province 
south of Johannesburg.  The government used lethal force to crush a peaceful protest against the Pass 
Laws.  The result was 69 people killed and 186 wounded. 
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South African Communist Party (SACP):  Founded in 1921, the mission statement of the 
party states that it is at the “forefront of the struggle against imperialism and racist 
domination.” (“South African Communist Party (SACP)” 2013) 
 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU):  COSATU is a federation of trade 
unions with more than 20 affiliated trade union just over two million members.  Although 
not a political party, COSATU is part of what is known as the Tripartite Alliance with the 
ANC and SACP.  Through this alliance COSATU is able to wield political influence 
through affiliation and by putting up candidates for election via the ANC. (“About the 
Tripartite Alliance” 2013) 
 
Congress of the People (COPE):  Mosiuoa Lekota, Mbhazima Shilowa and Mluleki 
George, high-ranking ANC officials, split from the ANC and formed COPE in 2008 to 
contest the 2009 general election. The split from the ANC was a response to what can, 
in its most basic sense, be simplified as Thabo Mbeki supporters v. Jacob Zuma 
supporters. 
 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP):  In 1990 the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement, 
which had been founded in 1975 by Dr. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, was transformed into 
the Inkatha Freedom Party, with Dr. Mangosuthu Buthelezi at its head.  Dr. Buthelezi 
remains the head of the IFP today.  The original incarnation of the IFP was started as, 
among many other reasons, the non-violent, anti-apartheid political movement within 
South Africa and had many former ANC “office-bearers and activists” in its ranks. 13 
(“Inkatha Freedom Party” 2013) 
 
Agang SA:  Newly formed political party (officially launched in June 2013) and lead by 
Dr. Mamphela Ramphele.  Agang SA is challenging the ANC and was borne out of 
frustration from, “Years of bad leadership, lack of imagination, the absence of 
accountability and rampant government corruption…” (Ramphele 2013)   
 
                                                
13 By 1961 the ANC had been banned from South Africa and was operating in exile. 
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The leadership of Agang SA estimates they could take 1% of the vote in the 2014 
general election.  In a country where the dominant political party took the last general 
election with 66% of the vote, garnering 1% of the vote in its first general election 
showing will be a victory for Agang SA. 
 
There are eight Metropolitan Districts in South Africa, including eThekwini, and the ANC 
has the political majority in seven of them – the DA controls the eighth, which is the City 
of Cape Town 
 
Policy 
With the advent of democracy in South Africa came the ratification of what is 
considered a highly progressive Constitution (The Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996).  The context within which national housing policy is framed is rooted in 
several major pieces of legislation in addition to the Constitution; the National Housing 
Act (1997), Breaking New Ground: A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of 
Sustainable Human Settlements (2004) and the Revised National Housing Code (2009).  
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides rights specific to housing, 
including: 
 Every citizen has the right to… reside anywhere in, the Republic (Section 21.3) 
 Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. (Section 26.1) 
 The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of this right. (Section 
26.2) 
 No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, 
without an order of court… No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions (Section 
26.3 
 
The National Housing Act of 1997 expounds upon the rights to housing laid down in the 
Constitution.  The Housing Act outlines the principles upon which national housing policy 
will be formulated and defines the roles and responsibilities of government in executing 
those policies.  Some of the principles to which government must adhere are (a non-
exhaustive list) (“National Housing Act of 1997”): 
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 Prioritize the needs of the poor 
 Consult with communities and individuals 
 Ensure a wide variety of housing options 
 Ensure that developments are environmentally, economically and socially 
sustainable and based on Integrated Development Plans (IDP’s) 
 Developments must be administered in a transparent manner 
 Promote the functioning of the housing market 
 
With ten years of experience and housing delivery statistics to analyze, the South 
African government realized it needed to take a new approach to delivering on the 
housing rights afforded to all South Africans.  This review led to a significant shift in policy 
from the provision of housing to the development of sustainable human settlements.  It 
was within this environment that the Cabinet approved the Breaking New Ground 
(BNG)14 plan in September 2004.  The Plan has the following objectives for sustainable 
human settlements (“The National Housing Code: Part 2, Policy Context” 2009): 
 Accelerate the delivery of housing as a key strategy for poverty alleviation; 
 Utilize the provision of housing as a major job creation strategy;  
 Ensure that land and housing can be accessed by all as an asset for wealth 
creation and empowerment;  
 Leverage growth in the economy;  
 Combat crime, promote social cohesion and improve the quality of life for the 
poor;  
 Support the functioning of the entire single residential property market to reduce 
duality within the sector by breaking the barriers between the first economy 
residential property boom and the second economy’s property slump, and;  
 Use housing delivery as an instrument for the development of sustainable human 
settlements, in support of spatial restructuring.  
 
The policies and strategies by which these principles are put into practice are found in 
                                                
14 In current vernacular, BNG has replaced the use of RDP when referring to State-subsidized housing for 
low-income populations. 
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the National Housing Code, which is updated annually.15   
 
There are two national departments that have primary responsibility for housing and 
land use:  the Department of Human Settlements (DHS) and the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform (RDLR). 
 
The Minister of DHS is Mr. Tokyo Sexwale and the following table provides an 
abbreviated list of the DHS’s legislative mandates that provide the framework within 
which the DHS operates. 
 
Title of Mandate Description 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
Section 26.1 and 26.2 
Enshrines access to adequate housing as a 
basic right for all South Africans.  The State must 
take reasonable measures to work toward 
ensuring all South Africans enjoy this right.* 
Housing Act, 1997 
Requirement to determine national housing 
policy and programs and negotiate funding for 
such programs.  Requires Minister to establish 
housing institutions. 
Comprehensive Plan for the Creation of 
Sustainable Human Settlements (aka, 
Breaking New Ground or BNG) 
Reinforces vision of the Department to promote 
the achievement of a non-racial, integrated 
society through the development of 
sustainable human settlements and quality 
housing. Requires vigorous engagement and 
participation of sector-specific stakeholders, 
which include the Presidency, Government 
Departments, the private sector and civil 
society. 
Housing Consumers Protection Measures 
Act, 1998 
Provides for the establishment of a statutory 
body for homebuilders – the National Home 
Builders Registration Council.  Registers builders 
engaged in certain categories of house 
construction and regulated the home building 
industry.  The Department is to monitor 
implementation of the Act continuously. 
Housing Development Agency Act, 2008 Facilitate the acquisition and the holding of 
                                                
15 At the time of this writing, the most recent publicly available update of the National Housing Code was 
for 2009.  It is possible that annual updates are produced and distributed within government, but not 
published for public access via the government website. 
TABLE 1.1 
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land and landed properties; facilitate the 
planning processes and coordinate funding for 
the land identified for sustainable human 
settlement development; fast-track housing 
development process.  As of 2009, required to 
monitor implementation of Act continuously 
Social Housing16 Act, 2008 
Establishes the Social Housing Regulatory 
Authority, which will regulate and invest to 
deliver affordable rental homes in integrated 
urban environments.* 
 
In accordance with legislation enacted and as noted in the preceding table, the 
following institutions have been established by and report to the DHS: 
 
Name of Entity Description 
National Home Builders Registration Council 
(NHBRC) 
Original primary mandate was to search for 
new and better ways to mobilize housing 
finance from sources outside the State in 
partnership with the broadest range of 
organizations.  In 2010/2011 the core business of 
the NHBRC was refocused to facilitate 
increased and sustained lending and 
contributions by the private sector.  
National Urban Reconstruction and Housing 
Agency (NURCHA) 
NURCHA is a partnership between the South 
African Government and the Open Society 
Institute of New York.  NURCHA is a 
development finance company that provides 
financing and support services to Contractors 
and Developers for subsidized and affordable 
housing projects, as well as infrastructure and 
community facilities’ projects.  NURCHA also 
participates in an ‘emerging contractor 
incubator’ program that focuses on building 
skilled capacity for future construction projects. 
Housing Development Agency (HDA) 
Established as per the Housing Development 
Agency Act, 2008, noted previously under 
legislative mandates. 
Social Housing Regulatory Authority (SHRA) Promotes development of social housing 
                                                
16 In South Africa, Social Housing is “rental accommodation for low to medium income households which is 
developed and managed by a Social Housing Institution” (The Social Housing Foundation 2010) and 
targets populations with monthly incomes between R800 and R7,500.   
TABLE 1.2 
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sector, regulates all social housing institutions 
obtaining public funds and gives statutory 
recognition to social housing institutions.17 
 
The Minister for the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform is Mr. Gugile 
Nkwinti and the following table provides an abbreviated list of the RDLR’s legislative 
mandates, which provide the framework within which the RDLR operates. 
 
Title of Mandate Description 
Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act, 1991 
(Act No. 112 of 1991). 
The Act provides for the upgrading and 
conversion of certain rights into ownership in 
respect of land, as well as for the transfer of 
tribal land to full ownership by tribes. 
Provision of Land and Assistance Act, 1993 
(Act No. 126 of 1993). 
The Act provides for the designation of certain 
land, the regulation of the subdivision of such 
land and the settlement of persons thereon. It 
also provides for the acquisition, maintenance, 
planning, development, improvement and 
disposal of property and the provision of 
financial assistance for land reform purposes.  
Distribution and Transfer of Certain State 
Land Act, 1993 (Act No. 119 of 1993). 
The Act provides for the distribution and transfer 
of certain State-owned land, to persons or 
descendants of persons who were removed 
from such land and had, prior to 27 April 1994, 
submitted applications to the then Advisory 
Commission on Land Allocation, and the 
Commission had confirmed their possible 
entitlement to such land. The Minister is 
authorized to designate such land, and to 
appoint a Land Distribution Commissioner to 
investigate and make awards to such persons 
who are found to have legitimate claims to 
such land 
Restitution of Land Rights Act, 1994 (Act No. 
22 of 1994). 
The Act provides for the restitution of rights in 
land to persons or communities dispossessed of 
such rights after 19 June 1913, as a result of past 
racially discriminatory laws or practices. To 
                                                
17 A Social Housing Institution is one that has been accredited by the SHRA after passing seven assessment 
points: Appropriate legal form, not-for-profit, good governance, financial sustainability, effective tenant 
management, efficient property management and adequate property development plans. (Social 
Housing Regulatory Authority 2011)  
TABLE 1.3 
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administer this task, the Act established a 
Commission on Restitution of Land Rights and a 
Land Claims Court. The Minister is authorized to 
purchase, acquire in any other manner or 
expropriate land or rights in land for the 
purpose of restitution awards. 
KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Act, 1994 
(Act No. 3 of 1994). 
The Act makes provision for certain land to be 
held in Trust and to be transferred to affected 
communities. The affairs of the Trust are 
administered by the Ingonyama Trust Board, 
which was established in terms of this Act. 
Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act, 1996 
(Act No. 3 of 1996). 
The Act makes provision for the security of 
tenure of labour tenants, and those persons 
occupying or using land as a result of their 
association with labour tenants. It also makes 
provision for the acquisition of land and rights in 
land by labour tenants.  
Communal Property Associations Act, 1996 
(Act 28 of 1996). 
The Act enables communities to form juristic 
persons, to be known as communal property 
associations in order to acquire, hold and 
manage property on a basis agreed to by 
members of a community in terms of a written 
constitution; and to provide for matters 
connected therewith. 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act, 1997 
(Act No. 62 of 1997). 
The Act makes provision for measures, with 
State assistance, to facilitate long-term security 
of land tenure, to regulate the conditions of 
residence on certain land, and to regulate the 
conditions on and circumstances under which 
the right of persons to reside on land may be 
terminated. The Act further regulates the 
conditions and circumstances under which 
persons, whose right of residence has been 
terminated, may be evicted from land. 
 
A pivotal piece of legislation is currently under review, and has been in development 
for 12 years:  The Spatial Planning and Land Use Bill.  In a Parliamentary session to 
debate the bill on February 26, 2013, the Minister Nkwinti began by saying, “The Spatial 
Planning and Land Use Management Bill is premised on a transformative spatial vision, 
with clear proposals to achieve spatial equity, integration, sustainability, good land 
administration and efficiency.” (Nkwinti 2013)  The Bill would provide a comprehensive, 
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nation-wide framework to address spatial disparities that persist almost 20 years after 
the end of apartheid.  The Bill also recognizes that Municipal governments are at the 
forefront of effectively implementing any legislature that results from this Bill and it will be 
the role of National and Provincial governments to ensure Municipal governments have 
the tools, funding and capacity to be successful. 
 
An interesting stipulation on the Bill is that “a land use regulator [i.e., municipal 
governments] considering an application before it, may not be impeded or restricted in 
the exercise of its discretion on the ground that the value of land or property could be 
affected by the outcome of the application.” (Nkwinti 2013)  How this plays out in the 
real estate market will be interesting to observe as it implies that if a land use/project 
meets the goals set out in the Bill, but has the potential to decrease surrounding land 
values, that point cannot be taken into consideration when deciding on the 
application.  And the reverse is true – if a project has the potential to increase surround 
land values, but doesn’t meet the objectives of the Bill, that factor cannot be 
considered. 
 
The Provincial Government of KwaZulu-Natal passed additional legislation in regard to 
land use and planning, which are the KwaZulu-Natal Land Administration Act, 2003 and 
the KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Act, 2008.  Together these Acts cover 
issues of land acquisition, expropriation, relaxing restrictions on changes in land use and 
creating standards and norms for provincial land use and urban planning. 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS: SOUTH AFRICA BY THE NUMBERS 
During apartheid, the forced relocation of Black Africans to areas far from employment 
centers, services and infrastructure resulted in an inverse population density (Figure 1: 
Population Density).  This inverse density distribution holds true at all major metropolitan 
centers (Durban, Johannesburg, Cape Town).  The population was not only racially 
segregated, but the people in the densely populated townships were also the poorest 
and least educated in South Africa.18   
                                                
18 There were rare exceptions to this ‘rule,’ Nelson Mandela being one of them.  Mr. Mandela was born to 
the Thembu royal family and educated at Fort Hare University and then studied law at the University of the 
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KwaZulu-Natal is home to 10,267,300 South Africans – almost 20% of South Africa’s total 
population.  The city of Durban is part of eThekwini municipality, is home to 3,442,361 
people and is also where Africa’s largest and busiest port is located.  According to data 
gathered during the 2011 Census, 11% of adults in KwaZulu-Natal had no schooling and 
only 9% of the adult population had received education beyond high school (Table 1.4). 
 
In 2008, fourteen years after the end of apartheid, South Africa was the most unequal 
                                                                                                                                                       
Witwatersrand.  Fort Hare and the University of the Witwatersrand were key institutions for the education of 
Black Africans up until 1959 when they were subsumed by apartheid. 
Adapted from: commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Ethekwini_2001_population_density_map.svg
Population Density Map: eThekwini
Metro Durban 
Figure 1: Population Density
www.statssa.gov.za/Census2011/Products/Census_2011_Census_in_brief.pdf
Table XX
FIGURE 1.3 
TABLE 1.4 
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country in the world with an income GINI coefficient of .70.19 (World Bank 2013, 38)  In 
2009 South Africa had nudged itself one spot better to be the second most unequal 
country in the world with a GINI coefficient of .631. (“GINI Index | Data | Table” 2013) 
 
  
 
   
  Durban Port, photo credit dukestradingza (Flickr) 
 
 
                                                
19 GINI coefficient is commonly used as a measure of inequality of income or wealth with zero being 
perfectly equal and one being perfectly unequal. 
FIGURE 1.4 
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Migration 
For a period of 10 years, KwaZulu-Natal has been one of five provinces that have 
experienced an outflow of people.  The Census 2011 report indicated that KwaZulu-
Natal was one of four provinces that had net negative migration figures. (Statistics 
South Africa 2013a) 
 
            
The net migration for KwaZulu-Natal was a loss of just over 30,000 people with the 
majority of those leaving the province going to Gauteng.  
 
GDP and Employment Statistics 
South Africa’s economy is one of the largest and most developed in Africa and is one 
of the world’s leading producers of platinum, gold, chromium and iron.  “From 2002 to 
2008, South Africa grew at an average of 4.5 percent year-on-year… However, in 
recent years, successive governments have failed to address structural problems such 
as the widening gap between rich and poor, low-skilled labour force, high 
unemployment rate, deteriorating infrastructure, high corruption and crime rates.” 
(Taborda 2013) 
 
The following chart illustrates a relatively robust annual rate of growth in GDP, which 
can reasonably be attributed to increased spending on infrastructure and related 
projects in the run-up to the 2010 World Cup for soccer.  And the ensuing dip in GDP 
growth can then reasonably be correlated to the completion of those major projects 
without adequate increases in production from the economy as a whole to pick up the 
slack. 
FIGURE 1.5 FIGURE 1.6 
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In regard to the calculation of labor statistics, the strict definition of the labor force is the 
number of people ready to work that fall in the 15 – 64 age group.  The unemployment 
rate is thusly calculated as the percentage of the labor force that is unemployed.  This 
strict calculation excludes those not “economically active and discouraged workers.”20  
According to a Special Report in The Economist, the “official national unemployment 
rate is 25%, but the real figure is above 40%.” (“South Africa: Cheerleaders and 
Naysayers” 2013, 15)  Between third quarter 2010 and first quarter 2013, the South 
African economy has added 646,000 jobs.  This slow pace of economic growth has left 
South Africa short of gaining back losses sustained during the economic crisis of 2008.  
 
 
                                                
20 These are defined as people who are not available for work, such as full-time scholars and students, full-
time homemakers, those who are retired and those who are unable or unwilling to work. (“Census 2011: 
Methodology and Highlights of Key Results” 2012, 22) 
FIGURE 1.7 
FIGURE 1.8 
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Census 2011 results show a lower employment than reflected in the Quarterly Labour 
Force Survey.  This is largely due to the difference in the reference period used in 
Census 2011 (one week) compared with the reference period of three months used in 
the QLFS. Persons employed in short-term or casual jobs were more likely to be 
captured in QLFS than in Census 2011. This occurred specifically in provinces with a 
large share for the informal sector in total employment, such as KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern 
Cape and Limpopo.” (Statistics South Africa 2013b) 
 
The Census 2011 numbers also show major wealth disparities persist.   
• GDP R100,788 per capita21 
• From 2001 to 2011 average annual income for Black households (not individuals) 
increased 169% from R22,522 to R60,613 
• The average White household has average annual income of R365,134 
  
                                                
21 At the time of this writing, the exchange rate was approximately R10 = $1.00 
FIGURE 1.9 
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 Unemployment numbers also show a large gap when broken down by race22 
o Nearly 50% of Black adults are unemployed 
o 10% of White adults are unemployed 
 
 
  
 
Why is it important to understand income trends based on race?  In this case, it is 
important because almost 80% of South Africans are Black and the implications of 
stagnant upward income mobility for 80% of a country’s population, or approximately 
40 million people, has a direct impact on the housing sector. 
  
                                                
22 Unemployment statistics broken down by race are provided as an example of how much work the South 
African government still has to do in terms of income and opportunity gaps between Whites and non-
Whites (Black, Indian, Coloured, etc.).  Overall unemployment is unsustainably high and should be 
attacked in a manner that affords access to education, secure housing, skills training and health care to 
everyone without regard to race.  Reducing unemployment by way of creating a more skilled work force is 
beneficial to all… a rising tide lifts all boats. 
FIGURE 1.10 FIGURE 1.11 
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PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION 
Exacerbating the housing issue in KZN is the lack of a robust public transportation system 
outside of the Durban Metro area.  In addition to the Durban metro area, there are at 
least three large employment centers (circled in red in Figure 1.12), but the most reliable 
public buses, known as the People Mover, only operate within the Durban metro area 
noted with the red triangle.  According to the eThekwini Integrated Transport Plan 
issued in 2010, there were “seven bus contracts covering approximately 70% of the 
metropolitan route system. Some 170 unsubsidised bus operators in thirteen associations, 
along with approximately 20 independent operators” covering the route system. 
(eThekwini Transport Authority 2010, 6.7)  There is also a rail system but, with the 
exception of the People Mover, ageing stock, unpredictable schedule delays, 
suspended service and safety concerns plague the rail and other bus routes. 
 
Due to the lack of a robust public transit system, those who cannot afford to own a car 
rely on minibus taxis.23.  Figure 1.13 shows the extent of the public transport system, 
which includes minibus taxis covering most of the road-based routes. 
 
                                                
23 It should be noted that the prevalence and use of minibus taxis is so overwhelming that the government 
includes them in ‘public transport.’ 
FIGURE 1.12 
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South Africa’s affordable housing market is akin to the perfect storm of factors working 
against its success:  a painful and not-too-distant past of race-based oppression, spatial 
dislocation, corruption, bureaucracy, land rights issues, obstacles to implementation of 
construction innovations, and limited financing for lower-income populations.  A major 
contributing factor to many of the obstacles holding down overall economic growth in 
South Africa, although not a direct real estate market driver, is the availability of quality 
education beginning at the primary level.  In her launch speech for Agang SA, Dr. 
Ramphele noted “only 10 percent of the born-free generation who passed matric in 
2012 qualified to enter university.” 24   Although outside the scope of the author’s 
research, education reform warrants inclusion in this discussion because improved 
education opportunities have the ability to transform, for the better, multiple economic 
sectors.   
 
                                                
24 In South Africa “matrics” are the equivalent of High School seniors in the United States. At the end of the 
12th grade, matriculation exams are given. It is possible to pass the ‘matric’ exams but not earn a 
Matriculation Endorsement, which is the minimum required to attend college. 
FIGURE 1.13 
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In order to effectively address the critical shortfall in the low-income and affordable 
housing market, all of these factors must be addressed.  In terms of affordable housing, 
innovative reforms are required that take into consideration land, construction and 
financing costs at the same time instead of attacking each one in a vacuum.  
Overarching all of these factors is the need to effectively address the impact of 
corruption on affordable housing development, the overall growth of the economy 
and the people’s ability to trust their leaders. 
 
  
 37 
2 | METHODOLOGY 
This thesis employs a qualitative analysis approach and is focused on understanding the 
major drivers contributing to the extreme deficit in affordable housing in South Africa, 
with emphasis on the province of KwaZulu-Natal, and positing potential scenarios to 
mitigate this shortfall.  The primary contributing cost factors on which the author focuses 
are the costs of land, construction and financing, as well as the role of corruption within 
the development process.  A qualitative analysis of the data gathered is used to 
propose potential economic solutions to any challenges identified. 
 
One of the challenges inherent in gathering qualitative data in regard to corruption is 
determining the veracity of the source.  Reports of corruption in South Africa are 
copious and enthusiastically covered in a multitude of media venues and anecdotal 
knowledge of corrupt activities was liberally conveyed during the author’s interviews.  
The potential pitfall of this data lies in the question of, who stands to benefit?  All reports 
of corruption are not accurate, and it is not entirely uncommon for political or business 
rivals to intimate corruption on the part of the other in an effort to undermine a 
population’s or market share’s perception of their competitor.  However, the author 
uses the overabundance of reports of corruption, along with anecdotal accounts of 
first-hand knowledge of corruption, as the basis for the assertion in this thesis that a 
significant level corruption exists in and has a material impact on the development of 
affordable housing, and the economy as a whole. 
 
Beginning with two referred contacts in South Africa who have direct and tangential 
experience in the real estate industry, a snowball sampling approach was used to 
identify and select additional respondents.  Over a two-month period during the 
summer of 2013, the author conducted 15 semi-structured and conversational 
interviews with private sector industry practitioners, businessmen with experience 
interacting with public sector officials, as well as college students.   
 
In order to obtain first-hand information in regard to development project experience, 
industry practitioner respondents were selected based on occupying a company 
position where they were a decision-maker on at least one housing development 
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project within the past two years, with preference for being currently engaged on at 
least one project.  Business professional respondents (non-real estate sector) were 
selected based on their knowledge and experience interacting with public sector 
officials in a variety of capacities.  College students were selected based on their 
experience as South African citizens that had spent at least ten years living under the 
apartheid government. 
 
Formally scheduled interviews were conducted in person at locations convenient to the 
respondent.  Both formally scheduled and non-scheduled conversational in-person 
interviews were conducted in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.  Additional interviews were 
conducted via Skype audio or video call with follow up question and answer 
correspondence conducted via email. 
 
Additional anecdotal data was gathered via conversational interviews with 
entrepreneurs (non-real estate industry) and educators.  In total, nine (9) hours of 
qualitative data was audio recorded, with an additional 6 hours of qualitative data 
recorded by hand in the form of Field Notes. 
 
Recorded interviews had a semi-structured format with sample questions as follows: 
1. What is your role within your company/government branch? 
2. How long have you worked in the real estate sector/for this branch of 
government? 
3. What have been your experiences in regard to Affordable Housing 
developments? 
4. Are there any government programs you feel are having a positive impact on 
the delivery of affordable housing? (If not, why not?  And if so, how so?) 
5. Thinking of Land, Construction and Financing as three major cost drivers, which 
one (if only one) is impacting the cost of affordable housing most? 
6. Are there any other factors having a greater impact on affordable housing, 
which are not identified in the above noted cost drivers? 
7. Please provide an overall assessment of the affordable housing market (what’s 
working, what’s not, etc.) 
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The industry respondents represent developers that are currently, or have within the 
past three years, overseen low-income, affordable, mid- and up-market projects in the 
KwaZulu-Natal province. 
 
Other supplementary data included in this thesis are gathered from published reports 
from NGO’s, various news media, the government of South Africa, and literature 
specifically addressing corruption in South Africa. 
 
Due to the sensitive nature of certain aspects of this research, the names of the 
respondents and their employers are not referenced herein.  Therefore, to protect their 
anonymity respondents are cited with reference to their industry or professional title only. 
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3 | THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING MARKET 
WHAT, WHERE AND HOW BIG 
In South Africa, affordable housing “means rental or individual ownership tenure over 
fully serviced dwelling units by households with incomes from R3,500 to R15,000 per 
month.” (Aiello Constultancy and McIntosh Xaba Associates 2012, 26)  Within this 
market are those that fall within the “gap” market – households that earn between 
R7,500 and R15,000.  This sub-group has been named the “gap” market because, until 
recently, there were no subsidies available to this group, there was a significant lack of 
housing stock available that was affordable, and mortgage financing was scarce.  
Those in the gap market earn too much to qualify for a government subsidized home in 
the BNG program and usually earn too little to qualify for mortgage financing (or the 
means to amass the requisite equity to secure a mortgage).  Affordable housing stock is 
generally defined as residential properties whose value is ≤R500,000, and an area is 
considered to be an “affordable housing area” is the average of home values in the 
area is ≤R500,000. 
 
The average size of a household25 varies 
and in South Africa, due to abandonment 
and high mortality rates from Tuberculosis 
and AIDS, some 122,000 of households are 
“child-headed” households (see Figure 
3.1 for orphan status of child-headed 
households Meintjes et al. 2009), and the 
data also show that there are more 
women-headed households regardless of 
settlement type.  Figure 3.2 shows 2011 
average household size based on type of 
housing settlement and is further broken 
down by gender. 
                                                
25 The Census defines a household as a “group of persons who live together and provide themselves jointly 
with food and/or other essentials for living, or a single person who lives alone.” 
FIGURE 3.1 
 41 
 
 
In 2010, it was estimated there were “between 600,000 and 800,000 homes needed for 
this market.” (Wessels 2010)  Ms. Soula Proxenos, Managing Partner at International 
Housing Solutions, also quoted the lower figure of 600,000 units during an online 
interview on Closing Bell in June 2012.  Ms. Proxenos stated that there was a backlog of 
600,000 units of affordable housing and that demand would likely grow due to 
increased urbanization and an expanding middle class. (“Private Equity Investment in 
Africa with Soula Proxenos” 2012)  And according to a report issued in April 2013 by the 
Centre for Affordable Housing Finance and the Affordable Land & Housing Data Centre, 
28% of South Africa’s population fell within the income limits for affordable housing, 
which, based on the latest census figures, translates to more than 14 million people. 
(Affordable Land and Housing Data Centre and Centre for Affordable Housing Finance 
in Africa 2013)  
 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 indicate affordable housing (green and orange areas in Figure 3.3) is 
located away from urban centers and major infrastructure; it is also located at much 
greater distances from amenities and community services (blue dots in Figure 3.4). 
 
FIGURE 3.2 
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The national and municipal governments are trying to tackle the overwhelming 
demand for affordable housing with a multitude of programs, subsidies and policy 
reforms.  Based on my readings so far, less might be more.  In other words, there are so 
many different things going on that it might be more helpful to enact fewer programs, 
but ensure those programs are coordinated across multiple drivers and sectors 
(infrastructure, spatial disparities, housing subsidies, innovative financing structures).  
 
One conspicuous deficit in the current approach to the affordable housing issue is the 
absence of strong public/private partnerships.  This tide may be turning, but it’s turning 
slowly.  A major effort should be put forth to vet viable private enterprises with the 
appropriate experience and partner with them to address the need for affordable 
housing.  Incorporating training programs for low-income workers and requirements for 
hiring/contracting with competent non-white enterprises might be a way to make these 
partnerships palatable to the current administration. 
 
This market is distinct from the low-income housing market and the percentage of the 
population considered to be low-income earners.  These are people earning below 
R3,500 per month, who make up a considerably large percentage of the population.  
FIGURE 3.3 FIGURE 3.4 
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While the focus of this thesis is on the affordable housing market, it is worth noting the 
large swath of the population that fall within the low-income category because the 
government has a Constitutional obligation to provide “adequate housing.”  This has 
placed tremendous pressure on the government, which has not delivered to the extent 
expected, or promised, in 1994 and later ratified into the Constitution in 1996. 
 
THE GLOBAL AGENDA 
In 2000, the United Nations adopted the “Millennium Development Goals” (MDGs).  The 
seventh goal (MDG 7) is to “ensure environmental sustainability,” and one of its target 
goals – known as Target 11 - is “to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives 
of at least 100 million slum-dwellers.” (“United Nations Millennium Development Goals” 
2013)  This goal is known as MDG 7 Target 11 and was subsequently interpreted by 
several countries, including South Africa, as total slum eradication. (Huchzermeyer 2011) 
 
The KwaZulu-Natal Elimination and Prevention of Re-emergence of Slums Act, 2007 (the 
"KZN Slums Act") was a provincial law dealing with land tenure and evictions.  The KZN 
Slums Act was a highly controversial Act ratified by the Provincial Government of 
KwaZulu-Natal and was touted as a response to housing conditions.  Its first stated 
purpose was to “provide for the progressive elimination of slums in the Province of 
KwaZulu-Natal…” (KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government 2013)  In short, it authorized 
the eviction of “unlawful occupiers of slums.” It forced private landowners to evict 
shack dwellers and when they failed to do so, the government would step in and 
execute the evictions.  This program was meant as a beta test that would eventually be 
implemented across all of South Africa. The Act was widely criticized by many segments 
of society who said it was in conflict with the South African Constitution and Prevention 
of Illegal Evictions Act (PIE Act).  The KZN Slums Act was also considered to be repressive 
and anti-poor legislation. (abahlali.org/files/KZN Slums Act.pdf) 
 
In 2009 the squatters’ movement, Abahlali baseMjondolo, challenged the 
constitutionality of the KZN Slums Act all the way to the South African Constitutional 
Court and in a stunning decision by the court, they won.  The Court ruled that the Act 
would have allowed for the eviction of people without providing alternative housing 
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options, which violated the PIE Act.  This was a victory for those living in informal 
settlements and provided at least a small bit of security in a tenuous situation.  As with 
most situations, there is another perspective to be considered.  The catch 22 that has 
arisen with large-scale rural-to-urban movement when there is no housing to 
accommodate the new influx is that, out of need and desperation, these informal 
settlements are established on land that is relatively proximal to transportation and 
potential employment.  However, this is the same land, which if it were unoccupied, 
would likely be turned into low-income or affordable housing. 
 
KWAZULU-NATAL 
To put some numbers to this issue, in March 2013 a news article reported that there 
were 636 informal settlements in KwaZulu-Natal and 484 of those informal settlements 
were in eThekwini alone.  This translates to more than 410,000 people living in 150,000 
shacks.  An additional 11,000 families are living in government created transit camps26, 
some for as long as five years, waiting for the homes promised by the provincial 
government. (Rondganger and Nene 2013)  It would be incorrect to assume that 
everyone living in informal settlements falls into the “low-income” category.  While it is 
true that the majority fall into this category, there are also those that fall into the ‘gap 
market’ that live in these areas.  It is not uncommon for people to live in informal 
settlements even if they are making more than R3,500 per month.  If a person has 
negative reports on their credit and cannot secure a mortgage for a home, or due to 
transportation needs must remain close to their job, some may very well have received 
a subsidized house from the government but are now renting it out for the income and 
have moved back into a shack settlement.   
 
KwaZulu-Natal, with 19.8% of the total population of the country, is the second most 
                                                
26 When the government moves forward on a housing or infrastructure project, on state-owned land, and 
informal settlers already occupy the land, they will relocate the residents into transit camps.  The 
government is supposed to, usually within a year, find or build permanent housing for those moved into a 
transit camp.  Due to government failure to comply with this condition, a group of 37 families took the 
eThekwini Municipality to court.  The families had been moved into a transit camp with a court order stating 
they would have permanent housing in one year.  More than two years later they were still in the transit 
camp with no information regarding when the Municipality would comply with the court order.  In 
September 2012, the High Court ruled in their favor and ordered the Municipal government to comply. (De 
Vos 2012) 
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populous province in South Africa.  The sheer number of people in this area along with 
the fraction of the population in need of formal housing, and those moving into a 
position to purchase or let a home in the affordable market provides the provincial and 
municipal governments with an opportunity to lead the way in facing these challenges 
head on with innovative thinking and integrity. 
 
URBAN PLANNING AND ZONING  
Over the past few years, South Africa has been making efforts to embrace a holistic 
approach to planning that encompasses short-, medium- and long-term planning and 
takes into consideration the varying needs of rural and urban populations as well as the 
apartheid-created inequalities that still exist on a large scale.  These planning efforts are 
being taken at the National, Provincial and Municipal levels of government with a great 
deal of cooperation and input between the three spheres, private business 
stakeholders and impacted communities.  Planning documents at the national level 
include the National Spatial Development Framework and the National Development 
Plan 2030, and as noted in Context: Policy and Politics, the Spatial Planning and Land 
Use Bill. 
 
KwaZulu-Natal has passed two key pieces of legislation in regard to planning and land 
use: KwaZulu-Natal Land Administration Act, 2003 and the KwaZulu-Natal Planning and 
Development Act, 2008.  “In KwaZulu-Natal all applications for development are 
considered by municipalities,…” (Roos 2012, 2)  According to Schedule 5 of the 
Constitution, provincial planning, which includes provincial roads and traffic, are an 
exclusive competency of provincial governments, and regional planning is a 
concurrent functional area of both the provincial and national governments. 
 
eThekwini Municipality has municipal planning as an exclusive functional area, insofar 
as the municipality is responsible for creating urban planning schemes that facilitate 
achieving the goals laid out by national and provincial planning policies and that do 
not interfere with other municipalities.  Municipalities are also responsible for the delivery 
of services to their communities, which includes municipal roads, water, and refuse 
removal, etc. 
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As part of the eThekwini Integrated Development Plan, eThekwini designated an Urban 
Development Zone (UDZ) that is 771 hectares in total (see map below), within which 
building owners and developers that are turning a profit and are involved either in the 
new build or renovation of residential or commercial property may apply for tax 
incentives.  The area demarcated in the below map includes the greater Durban CBD 
and as of a press release on August 10, 2011, the UDZ has generated R1.6 billion of 
investment from developers and property owners and the Municipality has invested R5 
billion to improve public infrastructure, including the People Mover inner city bus system.  
1
eThekwini is moving to a digital system 
such that anyone is able to access the 
municipal GIS service and find out the 
current zoning of a specific property. 
 
Should a developer, or property owner, 
wish to pursue a change in current land 
use then, initially, they must contact the 
rezoning division of the municipality to 
discuss the proposed changes.   
 
After this discussion if the developer 
wants to move forward then they must 
draft a “motivation” statement, which 
must answer the following questions: 
2
 Is the rezoning good for the city?  
 Will the rezoning impact on others?  
 Is there a need for the intended use?  
 Is the intended use desirable at this specific location? 
 
The statement is then submitted with a rezoning application and the appropriate 
fee.  Straightforward rezoning applications can take up to four months to process. 
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The following flow charts (Gordon, Nell, and Di Lollo 2011, 7–8) provide a generalized 
overview of the development process (single use residential) from site identification and 
purchase through to a completed development with issuance of individual deeds for 
homes.  This process would vary depending on the type of development being pursued 
– residential only, commercial, mixed-use, etc., and becomes more complicated with 
larger parcels and multiple uses. 
 
A developer, whose family has been in the industry for more than a decade, indicated 
that they typically employ an agent or broker network for site identification and will only 
consider land that has no outstanding claims27 on it in order to reduce cost and risk. 
 
 
                                                
27 Land claims are discussed further in Chapter 4: Land Reform. 
FIGURE 3.5 
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As in the United States, the development of project plans may overlap with the 
acquisition of the land, and so the below development process can be seen as 
something that takes place as soon as is reasonably possible depending on the 
acquisition of land.  In the “Layout Plan” phase below, it is not necessary for a private 
developer to use a town planner to prepare the project plans.  However, the local 
authority must approve the plans and the process moves forward accordingly.   
 
  
FIGURE 3.6 
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This process is known as the township28 establishment process.  In some cases, as in 
taking agriculturally zoned land and rezoning for residential or other use, the entitlement 
process can take 2 – 3 years. 
 
FRAMING THE PROBLEM 
Thus far we have discussed, in broad terms, the socio-economic and socio-political 
context of the affordable housing market, as well as a basic overview of the 
development process.  In the ensuing chapters, we will gain an understanding of the 
land market, construction sector and finance sector along with the major challenges 
presenting themselves in each of these markets.  We will also delve deeper into the 
issue and impact of corruption, especially in the land market and construction sector 
 
The challenges and opportunities presenting themselves in the affordable housing 
market are legion.  There are the usual cost challenges of land, construction and 
financing that are compounded by the dualities created during apartheid, but 
corruption must be given its due as a cost driver on at least equal footing with the other 
major drivers noted.  Corruption is certainly starting to get much more attention at all 
levels of government, but, as I will demonstrate, it will take consistent application of the 
law and enforcement of consequences to materially reduce the incidences of 
corruption, and therefore its undermining of the economy and especially the housing 
market.   
 
The strength of South Africa’s housing market will be negatively impacted if corruption is 
not checked.  Earlier this year Tokyo Sexwale, Minister of Human Settlements, stated, 
“Regarding public servants in all three spheres of government who committed housing 
subsidy related misconduct and fraud, more than 290 have been arrested, over 240 
found guilty, and over 220 are facing internal disciplinary action. Nearly R30 million lost 
through corrupt activities has been recovered.” (Sexwale 2013)  The lingering question is, 
                                                
28 The term ‘township’ has a legal definition, apart from the historical meaning of where non-Whites were 
forced to live before and during apartheid, which is “a group of pieces of land, or of subdivisions of a piece 
of land, which are combined with public places and are used mainly for residential, industrial, business or 
similar purposes, or are intended to be so used.”  As defined in the Land Survey Act, 1997 
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how much was lost in total?  And how much more has been lost to corrupt activities 
that have not yet, and may never be, uncovered? 
 
Table 3.1 is taken from the eThekwini Municipal Medium-Term Budget29 covering the 
period 2010 to 2013 and indicates the backlogs in critical areas concerning housing, 
basic services and infrastructure.  These numbers continue to rise due to high levels of 
rural-to-urban movement, costs and complications in the land market, construction and 
finance sectors, and widespread corruption. 
 
As will be noted frequently in the following chapters, the way forward in crafting a 
viable plan to meet the challenges posed by low-income and affordable housing 
demand in South Africa requires political will, broad-based planning, and critical and 
creative thinking.  These new approaches should at least include diversifying and 
increasing economic output in rural areas, improving access to quality education and 
healthcare, a paradigm shift in density and housing typologies, stepping up efficiencies 
in basic service delivery and public transportation and a multi-faceted attack on 
corruption.  No small task, to be sure, and much credit must be given to those in the 
public and private sector that accept this responsibility with passion and integrity and 
continue to find a way forward toward a South Africa that lives up to the Constitution’s 
principles of total inclusion for everyone that calls South Africa home.  
                                                
29 Timeframes are based on the rollout of anticipated subsidies from the National Government.  Electricity 
timeframe is dependent on achieving housing delivery goals. 
TABLE 3.1 
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4 | THE LAND MARKET 
In 1994, when Nelson Mandela became President, whites owned an estimated 87% of 
commercial farmland while blacks owned only 13%.  The 1996 Census indicated that 
the make-up of the population was almost inverse to land ownership with 77% of the 
population made up of Black Africans, 11% White, 9% Coloured, and the Indian/Asian 
population at 3%. (Statistics South Africa 1998)  The imbalance of land ownership 
between Black and White farmers was compounded by the difference in the quality of 
the land – commercial farmland owned by Whites was of much higher quality than the 
mostly non-arable land allotted to Black Africans. 
 
THE CORNERSTONE OF APARTHEID 
The Natives’ Lands Act of 1913 was the first definitive piece of legislation that canonized 
the large-scale dispossession of Black Africans from their native lands and 
institutionalized the massive inequality of land distribution that continues to plague 
South Africa today.  The motivations behind the implementation of this Act were varied, 
but three drivers loom large: the desire to restrict what Whites saw as African 
encroachment on ‘their’ farmland and grazing lands; White politicians needs to 
severely limit African’s ability to own land and, therefore, qualify to vote in certain 
provinces; and to force more Africans into the labor market.  The Natives’ Land Act 
provided a solution to all of these issues, which were beginning to feed a growing panic 
among Whites that Africans were becoming too populous in areas of coveted 
agricultural land, too politically aware and more self-sufficient – i.e., able to choose to 
stay out of the discriminatory, low-wage labor market – than was convenient for White-
owned enterprises. 
 
The Act made it illegal for Blacks to own, buy, sell or lease land outside of the areas 
designated for Blacks (called ‘scheduled areas’) except from other Black Africans and 
Whites could not own, buy, sell or rent land within the scheduled areas.  Blacks who had 
been leasing land, as sharecroppers30, from White-owned farmers were not forced to 
leave the farms.  However, their status was changed from sharecroppers to laborers, 
                                                
30 A sharecropper is a tenant farmer that gives the owner of the land a share of the crop as rent. 
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which had a devastating impact on their ability to be self-sufficient.  The Act, a 
cornerstone of apartheid, forced Black Africans, who made up close to 70% of the 
population, to live and farm on little more than 7% of South African land.   
 
One hundred years after the Natives’ Land Act was passed and 19 years since its 
repeal and the fall of apartheid, “80% of blacks own only 17% of the land.” (Commey 
2013)  Land reform, thus far, has fallen woefully short of the goals outlined almost 20 
years ago. 
 
THE DENATIONALIZATION AND CONTINUED DISPOSSESSION OF AFRICANS 
The passage of the Natives’ Land Act in 1913 was the beginning of a long series of 
laws 31  passed that progressively pushed Black Africans further and further to the 
periphery of society and the economy, and eventually stripped them of South African 
citizenship altogether.   
 
The Native Urban Areas Act, 1923, established separate urban locations for Africans.  
Blacks were not allowed to own land in these areas but were permitted to remain 
quartered in the designated urban areas only for so long as Whites employed them. 
 
The Native Administration Act, 1927, set up a separate legal administration for the areas 
that had been designated for Blacks only.  The Administration Act, in short, subjected 
Blacks to rule by Proclamation and not by Parliament, which limited the court’s power 
to intervene in African affairs and limited African’s access to justice.  The Act also 
established the power of the traditional Chiefs based on territory and not traditional 
jurisdiction. 
 
The election of 1948 that elevated the Afrikaner’s National Party into power was 
followed by an onslaught of race-based laws that was apartheid.  One of the first was 
the Population Registration Act, 1950, which officially created race categories to which 
                                                
31 A more extensive list of laws can be viewed at the website titled, “The Heart of Hope: South Africa’s 
Transition from Apartheid to Democracy (http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php), which is a 
collaboration among University of the Western Cape, Robben Island Museum Mayibuye Archive and the 
University of Massachusetts – Boston. 
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every South African had to be assigned – White, Native (Black), and Coloured.  The 
determination of Black or Coloured was based on physical appearance, social 
acceptability and linguistic skills.32  The social and spatial impact of this law was that the 
manner in which people were classified could split families apart33 where some were 
classified as Black and some as Coloured, which would require them to live in different 
areas regardless of social or economic ties. 
 
Laws that followed in quick succession racially segregated urban areas where only a 
designated race was allowed to live or work34; suppressed any activity or association 
whose aim was to change the doctrine of the Union of South Africa; allowed the 
demolition of informal settlements and the forced removal of the inhabitants; restricted 
Africans’ abilities to move to another urban area; required all non-Whites to carry 
‘reference books’ that contained their photograph, where they were born, 
employment and tax records and any police encounters.  The government established 
separate, and profoundly unequal, services and public areas for Whites and non-
whites.  This covered everything from taxis to parks to schools and more. 
 
In 1959 the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act set up ten “Bantu Homelands” 
(Bantustans) that were made up of the existing land reserves where Blacks were forced 
to live.  By ‘granting’ the eventual self-government of these ‘independent’ homelands, 
the South African government was laying the groundwork to disenfranchise Blacks from 
South African citizenship.  The Bantu Laws Amendment Act, 1965, gave sweeping 
powers to authorities to limit the number of Blacks allowed to work in a White-
designated area, in a particular industry and the power to prohibit any further use of 
                                                
32  The determination of what race to assign a person that was not ‘obviously’ White brought about a still 
infamous practice called the ‘pencil test.’  In this ‘test’ a pencil was pushed into the hair of the person 
being ‘tested,’ if the pencil fell out freely, they were ‘white,’ if it did not then they were ‘black.’  A person 
having been determined ‘black’ via the pencil test could ‘appeal.’  The pencil would again be pushed 
into their hair and if the pencil fell out when the person shook their head, then they could be reclassified as 
Coloured.   
33 In a famous case, about which a movie was made titled Skin, Afrikaner parents, one or both of which 
were carrying a recessive African gene from generations back, gave birth to a little girl with brown skin and 
kinky hair.  The father passed a paternity test but at the age of 11, Sandra Laing was removed from her all-
White school, her parents were shunned and she was reclassified as Coloured. A news article about Sandra 
can be read at http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2003/mar/17/features11.g2.  
34 There were strict rules on who was allowed to remain in the urban areas for more than 72 hours. i.e., a 
Black person that had been born in and lived continuously in an urban area would be allowed to stay, but 
could be forcibly removed if an authority deemed him/her ‘idle or undesirable.’  
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Map used by permission of publisher, Taylor & Francis Group 
Black labor in an area, sending the ‘extra’ laborers back to the Bantustans.  In 1970 with 
the passing of the Bantu Homelands Citizen Act, Blacks were finally stripped of their 
citizenship.  This Act required that all Black Africans be assigned to one of the 
Bantustans35, regardless of whether they had actually ever lived in the area.  The intent 
of these laws was summed up by the Information and Interior Minister in 1970 when she 
said "No Black person will eventually qualify [for South African nationality and the right 
to work or live in South Africa] because they will all be aliens, and as such, will only be 
able to occupy the houses bequeathed to them by their fathers, in the urban areas, by 
special permission of the Minister." Connie Mulder, South African Information and Interior 
Minister, 1970. (Boddy-Evans 2013) 
 
With Blacks now officially ‘assigned’ to a ‘homeland,’ and with those areas set to be 
self-governing, the apartheid government had no reason to invest much in those areas 
and so they were bereft of bulk services (water, electricity, sewer), schools, public 
amenities and health facilities.  In terms of population numbers versus land area, the 
below map illustrates the land set aside for the Bantustans (shaded areas) – where 
approximately 35 million Africans were assigned to live – and the remaining land was for 
Whites, who numbered about 4 million.  
 
                                                
35 The Homelands were set up based on ethnic groupings, i.e., Xhosa, Zulu, Northern and Southern Sotho, 
Swazi, etc.  The assigned Homeland became a person’s place of citizenship. 
In aggregate, by 1936 
approximately 13% of 
land was allocated to 
the Homelands. 
 
Swazi Land and Basuto 
Land (now Lesotho) 
are not part of South 
Africa. 
FIGURE 4.1 
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LAND REFORM 
The monumental task of overcoming hundreds of years of dispossession, segregation 
and developmental neglect is what faced the ANC when they won the election in 
1994.  The ANC laid out an ambitious goal from the outset:  redistribution to Blacks of 
30% of agricultural land by 1999.  This date was subsequently pushed to 2014.  To date 
about 7% of agricultural land has been redistributed and the target date has been 
pushed out again and is now set at 2025.   
 
The new government took a three-pronged, market driven approach to land reform 
that included restitution, redistribution and tenure reform.  Restitution for urban land 
claims usually takes the form of financial compensation to approved claimants, while 
claimants on rural land either have land returned to them, or are provided land of 
similar quality that is located, as much as possible, in proximity to the land claimed; 
Redistribution is/was executed using a Willing Buyer/Willing Seller model with the 
government purchasing agricultural land for transfer to low-income blacks; and Tenure 
Reform, which provided security for tenant laborers (on farms) to remain without threat 
of arbitrary evictions and provided a process by which they could acquire the land 
upon which they resided and farmed.36 
 
LAND CLAIMS AND TENURE REFORM: WHOSE LAND IS IT? 
South Africans who had been forcibly relocated from their land under the Native’s Land 
Act, 1913 and under various governmental policies in the decades that followed, were 
given the opportunity to file a land restitution claim with the new government up until 
the end of 1998.  Rural and urban land claims took on an implicit difference:  rural land 
claims were almost exclusively made by large communities sometimes numbering in the 
thousands of people under one claim, while urban land claims were “usually subject to 
scores of individual land claims.” (Beyers 2013, 969)  There were so many claims filed 
that even though the deadline passed almost 15 years ago, some larger claims have 
                                                
36 These are broad descriptions of the reforms and their intent.  The laws governing these three approaches 
to land reform are, as most laws are, lengthy and complicated.  But, for those interested in reading the 
actual language of the laws, you can find links to them here: http://www.justice.gov.za/lcc/legislation.html. 
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not yet been settled, e.g., Blythedale Coastal Resort, which will be discussed later in this 
chapter under Urban Land Issues. 
 
The issue of tenure reform within the context of post-apartheid land reform, which 
deserves in-depth unpacking but which cannot be done in the scope of this thesis, 
involves tenure vs. titling.  Tenure, in this context, references the use of land that is held 
in tribal trust or communally held, as in the Ingonyama Trust in KZN, where inhabitants 
have traditional or negotiated tenure rights, but do not own the land.  Titling refers to 
the demarcation and registering of specific land parcels and the associated title deed 
issued to the individual owner of that parcel.   
 
There is much debate about the pros and cons of tenure and titling. As Pauline Peters 
discusses in her 2007 working paper for the Center for International Development, “The 
long-standing notion that customary tenure rights are insufficiently secure to promote 
optimal levels of investment in land use” (Peters 2007, 10) has been bolstered by the 
popularity of Hernando de Soto’s book, The Mystery of Capital.  The general argument 
is that by providing individual’s title to their land it can be used as an investment, e.g., 
as a tool to gain access to collateralized loans.  Critics fear that this approach will result 
in “’accelerat[ing] market-based land transfers, with potentially negative 
consequences for poorer holders of land rights more prone to distress sales’ (Chimhowu 
and Woodhouse 2006: 363)” (as quoted in Peters 2007, 11)  In regard to the assumption 
that traditional tenure structures will function efficiently and fairly, Pauline Peters 
includes the following: “On the contrary, writes Jean-Philippe Platteau (1996, 2000) 
among others, many existing customary or local sets of land tenure embody 
considerable inequality, intra and inter-group conflict, illegal sales by traditional leaders, 
and appropriation for private use by representatives of the state.“ (Peters 2007)  All of 
these issues present themselves in the land market in South Africa. 
 
Working in its favor, South Africa has a robust deeds registry system, commonly known 
as the Deeds Office, which is an independent entity under the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform.  The Deeds Office is “responsible for the registration, 
management and maintenance of the property registry of South Africa… providing 
 57 
the maximum protection of property due to the strict processes that are followed in 
registering a property within the Republic of South Africa.” (www.mydeedsearch.co.za) 
The Deeds Office can be accessed online with available search covering, inter alia, the 
registered owner of a property, property encumbrances, purchase price, and sectional 
title rules on the property.37  The government is also in the process of rolling out an 
eCadastre system, which will incorporate the cadastral databases of the Provinces with 
the deeds information and allow for electronic land transactions.  In a May 2013 
presentation by Oracle representative Sarel Coetzer in reference to South Africa’s 
eCadastre system, he included the following outcomes: 
 Consolidated national Cadastre 
 Government will have a single spatial repository to perform spatial queries and 
get monthly feedback 
 Standardization of all addresses and coordinates in a consistent format 
 Nationwide association of title deeds documents to land parcels 
 Manage South Africa’s cadastre from a centralized managed platform 
 
However, regardless of how advanced or robust are available tools and systems, if 
there is a lack of capacity and/or skill to use these tools, then a breakdown, or 
bottleneck, in the system is bound to happen.  To that point, in early 2012 a report from 
the Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa estimated that “between 1,1 and 
1,4 million subsidy beneficiaries” still did not hold the title to their properties. (Gordon, 
Nell, and Di Lollo 2011, 12)  If certain estimates are correct, that approximately 3 million 
subsidized homes have been built since 1994, then almost half are not officially 
registered with a proper title.  A property without a properly registered title has 
implications for both the owner and the municipality within which it is located.  In the 
instance of the municipality, property that is registered allows for the enforceable 
collection of property taxes and fees for service delivery.  Without a deed, to whom 
                                                
37 What you will not find in the Deeds Office database is the race of the property owner.  I am not 
advocating for race identification to be included on deeds, but mention this point as it is important when 
considering a very particular question:  How will the government know when it has reached the goal of 
redistributing 30% of agricultural land to blacks?  Since the Deeds Office does not record the race of a 
property buyer or seller, then the government cannot track changes in ownership of agricultural land that 
happens in the private sector – it can only base its statistics of agricultural land transfer on government-
facilitated land transfers.  I find this an interesting point to keep in mind where statistics on redistribution are 
concerned. 
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does the municipality send the bill for these taxes and services?  An accurate 
accounting of a municipalities’ revenue base is foundational to efficient governing and 
provision of services. 
 
The lack of proper deed registration restricts economic growth on several fronts – by 
limiting the property owner from entering the secondary market38 (selling the property 
on the open market) and also, without proper title, an owner cannot use his/her 
property to collateralize a loan.  In both of these instances the capital infusion from a 
home sale or loan could be used to purchase another home in a more well-located 
area, or, in the case of a loan, for incremental expansion of the property or to fund an 
entrepreneurial venture.   
 
The national government is currently in the process of creating a standardized, four-tier 
tenure system: (Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2011b, 6) 
 State and public land: Leasehold; 
 Privately owned land: Freehold, with limited extent; 
 Land owned by Foreigners: Freehold, but Precarious Tenure, with obligations and 
conditions to comply with; and, 
 Communally owned land: Communal Tenure, with institutionalized use rights 
 
Due to the complexities involved in communal tenure and the need to engage 
traditional leaders in this process, this tenure type has been assigned to a designated 
task force to pursue. 
 
The streamlined tenure system along with the roll out of the eCadastre will be effective 
tools in the process of understanding the scope of how much land is held by whom and 
in what tenure scheme – all critical pieces of information to properly formulate 
integrated planning and reform policies. 
 
                                                
38 Subsidized homes through BNG cannot be sold or let for eight years.  FLISP subsidized homes can be sold, 
but a pro-rata portion of the subsidy must be paid back to the government if the home is sold within the first 
eight years of acquisition. 
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RURAL LAND REFORM: THE FAILURE OF WILLING BUYER/WILLING SELLER 
The focus of South Africa’s land reform policies has been heavily geared toward rural 
land redistribution.  “This is consistent with the prevailing understanding within 
development studies that land reform is primarily a rural phenomenon—indeed, that 
developmental ‘land’ is rural.” (Beyers 2013, 966)  The presumption behind this focus is 
that an effective way of achieving a more equitable distribution of economic resources 
and opportunities for self-sufficiency is to promote the expansion of agrarian production 
and the creation of sustainable rural livelihoods. (Ibid.) 
 
The manner in which the newly elected government chose to go about acquiring the 
land for redistribution was market-based.  When it comes to redistribution, the 
government is the sole “willing buyer,” which puts the sometimes willing/sometimes 
unwilling sellers in a unique position.  With the government as the major buyer, a seller 
can potentially demand what they consider to be above-market prices for their land – 
the government, wanting and needing to make good on its promises, and the spirit of 
the Constitution, is put in a position of having to make acquisitions at the prices 
demanded by the sellers in order to ensure a sufficient amount of land is acquired for 
the redistribution targets.  Alternatively, it is also feasible that the sellers are demanding 
a price that they consider to be the fair market value of their land, and it is the 
government that considers the price to be above-market.  This scenario is quite possible 
because the way the government had been calculating the value of agricultural land 
differed from an open market-based valuation approach.  The government used a net 
present value model that discounted future cash flows of a commercial farm based on 
the farm’s expected production.  This method did not take into consideration 
externalities in the open market that can influence pricing, such as proximity to new 
infrastructure projects, increased demand for the land by other commercial farming 
entities and whether the land was at its highest and best use and, therefore, might 
command a higher price from developers speculating on a change in future land use. 
(Kirsten 2012)   
 
In areas, such as Limpopo (a Province north of KZN), which at one point had a high-
volume of redistribution efforts taking place, simple supply and demand forces could 
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drive land prices higher.  Consider the situation where willing sellers wish to remain in the 
agriculture industry and so, with the capital received from the government on the sale 
of their land, they enter the land market as buyers and increase demand for a shrinking 
supply of arable land, which in turn drives up prices. (Dagut and Bernstein 2008, 29)  
 
Multiple unwilling sellers (or sellers capitalizing on their ability to demand higher prices 
even if they would have been willing at a lower price) plus a dominant buyer is not the 
only thing that has potentially skewed the land market and retarded the ability of the 
government to make progress on land redistribution.  Corruption is known to be playing 
an influential role as well.  A published report from the Africa Research Institute noted, 
“Collusion between sellers, land valuers and government officials - and instances of 
corruption - have inflated market prices and made purchases prohibitively expensive.” 
(Cieplak 2013) 
 
Of particular interest is the government’s acknowledgement that these issues, including 
corruption, are indeed a significant hindrance to using the tools they have to meet their 
mandate for land reform.  As it pertains to the creation of a new national position of 
Valuer-General, a 2011 Green Paper on Land Reform issued by the RDLR, stated the 
following, inter alia, as problems in the valuation of land as regards land reform: 
(Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2011b) 
 South Africa lacks a nationwide comprehensive, reliable and collated hub of 
property values 
 The probity39 of some of the valuation is questionable 
 Conflict of interest and malpractices 
 
This discrepancy in valuation models, as well as a miscalculation in the complexity of 
nation-wide land reform, may very well have played a role in the underfunding and 
inefficient staffing of departments overseeing the varied aspects of land reform.  To 
combat these issues, the office of Valuer-General will “be responsible for issues such as 
the provision of fair and consistent land values for rating and taxing purposes and 
                                                
39 Emphasis on what the author considers politically correct words that reference corruption and/or fraud 
are the author’s. 
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determining financial compensation following expropriation under the Expropriation Act 
or any other policy and legislation which is in compliance with the Constitution.” (South 
African Government News Agency 2012b) 
 
Yet another factor that is hindering the redistribution efforts lies in the agrarian structure 
that is overlaid on these reforms.  The historical structure of agriculture in South Africa 
was based on smaller farms with higher productivity and the movement of herds to 
different grazing lands so as not to deplete one area.  When Blacks were forcibly 
relocated, much of their land was consolidated into large, White-owned commercial 
farms with established boundaries between farm owners.  Africans had been relocated 
to land that was much less favorable to farming and so most had to abandon their 
agricultural pursuits and enter the low-wage market.  With this shift over time in the size 
and manner in which farming was done, the post-apartheid government “…prioritised 
grafting redistributed land onto existing commercial units.” (Cieplak 2013)  One of the 
major shortcomings of this approach is that many of the beneficiaries of the 
redistributed land did not have the skill or capital to either maintain or improve the 
productivity of the land and now “much of this land has been deemed "no longer 
productive" by RDLR.” (Cieplak 2013)  In fact, as reported in a 2009 article in The 
Economist, the “government admits that about half the farms taken over by blacks 
have failed... Some put the failure rate at 70%. Since 2007 the country has been a net 
importer of food, after decades of self-sufficiency.” (“Land Reform in South Africa: Hurry 
Up” 2009)  This approach to rural land reform is clearly not working, which was noted by 
Dr. Edward Lahiff, a recognized expert on South African land reform, when he said in a 
PBS interview, “The state agencies must get over their obsession with large-scale, 
commercial production and accept the need for a radical restructuring of current land 
units. The strategy of settling large groups of relatively poor and inexperienced people 
on large commercial farms and expecting them to manage those farms effectively has 
clearly failed.” (Lahiff 2010)  
 
Rural Development and Land Reform Minister Gugile Nkwinti summed it up best when 
he said, "It is government's view that the willing buyer-willing seller has frustrated efforts 
to fast-track land reform, distorted the market, made land price negotiations 
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excruciatingly prolonged and increasingly making land reform financially untenable for 
the state…" (South African Government News Agency 2012a)  
 
URBAN LAND REFORM: MISSED OPPORTUNITIES FOR URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
As previously noted, the majority of urban land claims have been settled by financially 
compensating approved claimants.  This is because “most urban land subject to 
restitution claims has been redeveloped or purchased by private owners subsequent to 
[forced] removals [of black], and it is often difficult to locate suitable alternative land 
and expensive to obtain and develop it.” (Beyers 2013, 970) 
 
The preponderance of settling urban land claims financially does not achieve the 
purported democratic goal of eliminating spatial segregation, nor does it provide a 
means for sustained improvement in the quality of life for the beneficiaries.  Urban land 
restitution has the potential to provide a wider community benefit; especially if urban 
land claims are handled in aggregate in the way rural land claims are processed. 
 
Christiaan Beyers uses Port Elizabeth (Eastern Cape) as a specific example in his paper, 
Urban Land Restitution and the Struggle for Social Citizenship in South Africa.  In 1993 
with the anticipation of the land restitution process, the Port Elizabeth Land and 
Community Restoration Association (PELCRA) was established.  In short, Port Elizabeth 
chose to aggregate urban land claims and develop well-located urban land in lieu of 
financial compensation to claimants. (Ibid. 982) 
 
PELCRA went through a long process of community engagement, working with third-
party experts on legal matters, urban planning and project management.  They 
proceeded with the goal of creating a diverse mixed-income40, mixed-use community 
that included land for commercial businesses, open space and recreation facilities.  
                                                
40 Black Africans were removed from urban areas many years before the 1913 Act, and were not eligible to 
submit claims, or had passed away due to old age.  And, due to the highly restrictive laws passed 
beginning in 1913 that all but banned Black Africans from living or owning land in urban areas, the few non-
Whites that were able to own land tended to be, but were not exclusively, relatively speaking, more 
privileged and were Coloured or Indian.  This has somewhat skewed the ethno-diversity of those able to 
make viable urban land claims.  The exception being in KZN, where about a third of the urban land claims 
came from those living in the Cato Manor Township, who are primarily Black Africans. (Beyers, 2013) 
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The plan included serviced plots of land in varying sizes, which required the 
beneficiaries to have the means to build a home.  “To offset the direct loss of 
opportunity to claimants who are unable to build upon the land, an endowment fund is 
being created in the local university that will serve as a source of bursaries for first year 
students from disadvantaged backgrounds.” (Ibid. 983) 
 
While the Port Elizabeth project is not perfect, it is a creative example of how urban 
land claims can be approached in a way that is community-inclusive, promotes 
economically sustainable land use patterns, creates employment centers and provides 
well-located housing, secure tenure, access to amenities and improved quality of life 
for previously disadvantaged groups. 
 
At the moment, land restitution and land redistribution in urban areas takes two primary 
forms: government-subsidized housing (in lieu of redistribution) or financial 
compensation (in lieu of restitution of land).  This is unfortunate and South Africa is 
missing out on the chance to effect profound community and economic changes in its 
urban areas. 
 
A BUMPY PATH IN LAND REFORM 
Land reform is a necessity in South Africa.  Although the challenges and shortcomings of 
South Africa’s land reform programs are many, there are positive results as well that 
should not be overlooked.  In “Who’s Land Is It?” it was noted that an estimated 1.4 
million subsidy beneficiaries have not yet received the title deed to their property.  But 
the flip side of that coin is that if we assume that three million subsidized homes have 
been built, then about 1.6 million subsidy beneficiaries have received the title deed to 
their property.  In a post-apartheid world, that goes in the “win” column.  Whether those 
that have received the title to their property have used it to take out a collateralized 
loan toward education, incremental building or for business purposes is another 
question, which deserves answering but which cannot be addressed here.  The fact is 
that more than a million people, who did not have secure title to their homes, now 
have it and with it, at the very least, a sense of security that previously did not exist. 
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Another statistic noted was that at least half of the farmland redistributed to previously 
disadvantaged groups has failed to become productive.  Again, the flip side to that 
story is that up to approximately half have become productive and improved the lives 
of the beneficiaries.  An example of how the private sector can support government 
initiatives to improve the chances of success for beneficiaries of land is seen in the 
efforts of Kwanulu, which is the agricultural union in KwaZulu-Natal.  Kwanulu is “funding 
147 projects on 6,551 hectares aimed at rehabilitating failed land claim sugar cane 
farms.” (Dardagan 2012)  Private sector efforts such as these are vital not only for the 
success of land beneficiaries, but to free up government funds that are now being 
spent on rehabilitating failed or failing enterprises of land beneficiaries.  Figures given in 
a 2012 speech by Minister Nkwinti showed 25 percent of the national department of 
agriculture’s budget in 2012 was spent on recapitalizing 595 farms owned by land 
beneficiaries, which amounted to R900 million.” (Dardagan 2012) 
 
Yet another kink in the already winding path of land reform is that there are those that 
are eligible to be beneficiaries of land under the redistribution program, but prefer cash. 
And as President Zuma noted in his 2013 State of the Nation address, this preference for 
cash does not help the South African government change the patterns of land 
ownership in the country. (South African Press Association 2013a) 
 
“The municipality, faced with substantial housing and servicing backlogs has been 
placing a greater burden on private developers to pay for all new infrastructure that 
serves their developments. There is an increased occurrence of this due to the poor 
alignment between development and infrastructure plans. Determining what 
infrastructure is required occurs mostly on a project basis and this has led to increasing 
animosity between municipal departments and developer…” (Breetzke 2009, 14) 
 
As if there weren’t already enough obstacles on the path to land reform, there is the 
unrelenting issue of corruption.  In a March 2011 press release, Minister Nkwinti 
announced that joint efforts of his Department along with the SIU and Asset Forfeiture 
Unit (AFU) had taken action in KwaZulu-Natal to seize approximately R14 million worth of 
farms and assets that were linked to on-going investigations into the abuse of the land 
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reform program. (Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2011a)  
Additionally, in February 2013, the Hawks Commercial Crimes Unit 41  arrested three 
public officials and one KwaZulu-Natal businessman on fraud and corruption charges in 
relation to “the irregular awarding and administration of land reform grants, totaling R36 
million.  The Asset Forfeiture Unit has also frozen property to the value of R36 million in 
the case.” (Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2011a)  But even this 
elite unit of investigators known as the Hawks is not immune to corruption – in May 2013, 
the head of the Hawks in Mpumalanga province, Major General Simon Mapiane, was 
arrested for allegations of corruption related to falsified travel expenditures. (South 
African Press Association 2013c) 
 
The instances of corruption have persisted almost since the inception of the land reform 
program.  The following, in addition to what has already been noted, are just a very 
small tip of the corruption iceberg: 
 A report to the Department of Human Settlements by the SIU noted that 
government subsidized homes that are intended to go to the poorest and those 
with the most need are sold by corrupt Ward Councilors to unqualified 
beneficiaries. Houses are sold for between R6,000 - R25,000. (Special 
Investigations Unit 2010) 
 
 During the same meeting with the SIU, Mr. Royith Bhoola, a member of the 
national Parliament, described corruption in the housing program that was 
perpetrated by public officials and private sector professionals:  “municipal 
officials…often entered into a deal to evict innocent people and then a few 
hours later, they would sell that very same home.   He said that when one heard 
of attorneys and conveyancers being struck off the court roll, and when he 
heard of officials, contractor and engineers all involved in this type of corruption, 
he actually empathised with the Department as they had a mammoth task at 
                                                
41The Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI), known as the Hawks, is a specialized unit under the 
SAPS, and has been “tasked to prevent, combat and investigate national priority offences such as 
organized crime, corruption, economic crimes as well as any other crime referred to the Directorate by the 
South African Police Service's (SAPS) National Commissioner.” (South African Press Association 2009) 
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hand in trying to rule out this type of corruption.” (Parliamentary Monitoring 
Group 2010)  
 Mr Thabane Zulu, Director-General (DG), Department of Human Settlements 
(NDHS), stated that the “matter of syndicates42 was very sensitive, complex and 
life threatening and that people could lose their lives if they became whistle-
blowers and informers.  He added that some informers had in fact already lost 
their lives and that it was a very serious matter.” (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 
2010) 
 
A major retooling of land reform is already underway as there are two bills and one 
amendment that are close to being passed:  The Expropriation Bill, Restitution of Land 
Rights Act Amendment and the Valuation Bill.  However, there is widespread concern 
over these new laws as they will, among other things, reopen the land claims process 
that was closed in 1998, which, as Dr. Dr Anthea Jeffery, Head of Special Research, 
South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), notes in a media briefing: "Re-opening 
the land restitution process could stir up a 'a hornet's nest', especially as land already 
transferred to black South Africans could be claimed again by others. It will also unsettle 
title to land for at least another two decades, while putting pressure on an 
overburdened fiscus." (South African Insurance Times & Investments News 2013)  
Reopening the land claims process will also be highly disruptive to new development, 
as it will present a level of uncertainty and risk that cannot be managed by developers.  
Even when a large land claim has been “settled” there is, apparently, still the possibility 
that the settlement can be undone or challenged, which is the case in a current land 
claim involving a large developer, the eLan Group, and the Dube Community, located 
on the coast near KwaDukuza north of Durban.43 
 
In this case, the Dube Community, which represented 680+ families, filed a claim on just 
over a thousand hectares of land that, at the time, was commercially farmed with 
sugar cane.  A deal was struck between the eLan Group, the commercial farmer and 
the Dube Community whereby the commercial farmer would lease ~135 hectares of 
                                                
42 ‘Syndicates’ in this context is referring to the organized behavior of multiple individuals and or contractors 
that are defrauding the housing or land reform programs. 
43 eLan Group employees were interviewed regarding this case on condition of anonymity. 
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land to continue farming and the Dube Community will be paid ~R200 million (when the 
project is complete) and becomes a 20% stakeholder44 in the large-scale, mixed-use, 
mixed-income R1.95 billion eLan Group development, known as Blythedale Coastal 
Resort.  Due to the size of the claim and the complexities of the deal, it took years to get 
it finalized, but it was completed and development of the resort was given the green 
light in 2007. 
 
In real estate, development timing is critical and the delays in settling the land claim 
pushed the start of development out far enough to coincide with the global financial 
crisis, which put the brakes on the development.  Fast-forward a few years, and the 
Dube Community has now challenged the claim that the developer thought was 
settled.  They want to cancel the agreement and renegotiate.  Development has 
stalled and the issue is pending court resolution, which is expected in October 2013. 
 
There is speculation that something untoward is afoot in the unexpected disintegration 
of the deal with the Dube Community… Is it possible that another developer went to 
the Community with promises of more money?  Is it possible that some very high up 
politicos saw how valuable the land would become and now they are in cahoots with 
another developer and have manipulated the Dube Community into this challenge?  
Jabulani Mbaso, the representative hired by eLan Group to facilitate the original deal 
with the Community suddenly switched sides, after the deal was done, and is now 
advocating on behalf of the Community to get the deal canceled.  And, in another 
plot twist, Mr. Mbaso is currently on trial for corruption charges in an unrelated business 
matter. (“Bitter War in Paradise - City Press” 2013) 
 
The Blythedale case is as a cautionary tale for developers entitling land that is part of a 
land claim and underscores the continued uncertainty in the efficacy and validity in 
land claims process.  The impending October decision will be scrutinized for its 
implications going forward.   This case, along with the potential reopening of the land 
claims process could have a crushing effect on new development. 
                                                
44  Members of the Dube Community, or Clan, would also be first in line for jobs created by the 
development and would benefit from the low-income and affordable housing that would be built in the 
development. 
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Another concern is that although the Expropriation Bill allows the courts to make the 
final decision on what is “just and equitable” as compensation for expropriated land, 
Dr. Jeffery points out that neither compensation nor a full vetting of whether all 
constitutional requirements have been met needs to happen prior to expropriation by 
the State. (South African Insurance Times & Investments News 2013) 
 
Given the level of corruption already present in the land reform system, the potential 
reopening of land claim applications – and the associated broadening of the pool of 
potential claimants – and the ability to expropriate land prior to constitutional vetting or 
compensation presents and environment conducive to exploitative or fraudulent 
activity.   
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5 | CONSTRUCTION SECTOR 
From 2007 to 2011, the “South African construction industry increased in value at a 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 15.54%... This was supported by the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup, which acted as a catalyst to the growing South African construction 
industry.  The infrastructure market was the largest beneficiary of the World Cup, as 
most construction activity involved road, public transport and other infrastructure-
related developments.” (Research and Markets 2013) Business Wire’s Research and 
Markets group is forecasting a construction industry CAGR of 9.61% from 2012-2016.  This 
reduced growth is attributed to the “continuing euro-zone crisis, which is dampening 
global business sentiment.” (Research and Markets 2013)  If this forecast is accurate, 
then the growth is further off on the horizon as projections for 2013 are sub-3% with 
Business Monitor International noting “World Cup excesses, heavy bureaucracy and 
continuing political wrangles” putting a damper on the industry. (Business Monitor 
International 2013)   
 
At the same time, and in contrast to this somewhat bleak outlook, First National Bank’s 
Bureau for Economic Research reported that construction confidence was at a 4-year 
high.  "’Confidence increased even though the slower growth in construction activity 
continued for the second consecutive quarter,’ the report said.” (SouthAfrica.info 2013) 
 
“As a percentage of real GDP, the construction sector contributed approximately 3.8% 
as of first quarter, 2013. (Packirisamy 2013)  Statistics SA data also show a downward 
trend in the average size of dwelling units from 141 m2 to 108.8 m2. 
 
 “This smaller average size has been 
achieved through more rapid growth in 
the category dwelling houses smaller 
than 80 square metres which grew by 
20.8 percent y/y in terms of the number of 
units completed in Q1 2013.” (Mhlanga 
2013) 
FIGURE 5.1 
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Figure XX 
John Loos, and FNB Bank household and consumer sector strategist, says this uptick in 
the number of constructed units under 80 m2 indicates “solid growth in the Affordable 
Housing market and the flats and townhouses category.” (as quoted by Mhlanga 2013) 
 
“Mr. Loos anticipates that 2013 will see single-digit growth in overall residential building 
activity and with the drive towards a smaller average home size expected to continue, 
that would translate into a slightly more rapid growth rate in the number of units 
completed.” (Mhlanga 2013)  An important pricing issue that is not discussed in trending 
reports for the Affordable Housing market is what percentage of these new units that 
have come online or are in the pipeline will be priced such that they are qualified for 
the FLISP program (≤R300,000).  Stagnant income growth for the largest sector of the 
population (Blacks at 80% of the population), anticipated rising interest rates by 2015 
and continued high debt levels of consumers contribute to a sub-optimal growth trend 
in the housing market. 
 
   
 
While the growth of the construction sector is constrained, as illustrated in Figure 5.2 
above, and according to Joe de Beer Deputy Director-General, economic statistics at 
Stats SA, profits have been significantly curtailed since the boom leading up to the 
World Cup, the Construction Sector has the highest operating surplus of the ten major 
GDP sector contributors noted in Figure 5.3. 
 
FIGURE 5.2 FIGURE 5.3 
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CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY 
“Building materials have recorded prices well above inflation with reinforcing steel up 
38.9%, ceiling material up 10.8%, hinges by 9% and bricks by 8.6%.  Transportation and 
labour costs in the building industry have also gone up.  For 2012 the BER forecast for 
building costs is 12.1% rising to 16.3% in 2013” (Pillay 2012)  With such drastic increases in 
building materials, innovations in construction technology become even more 
important in reducing project costs and maintaining margins the market can tolerate. 
 
Even with the costs of materials rising at an alarming rate, there is still a slow slog to 
incorporate new and more cost efficient technologies.  The predominant building 
typology is ‘brick and mortar’ single-family homes.  When asked about the 
predominance of this low-density/higher cost typology the Development Director for a 
large South African developer said that there is an unspoken notion that “a house isn’t 
a real house unless it’s built from brick and mortar.”  And, added a local businessman, 
“the mindset is that drywall is for ceilings.  If the walls can’t stop a bullet from an AK, it’s 
not a real house.”  The historical experience that has created this, arguably 
understandable, perception is that under apartheid wealthy Whites had homes built of 
brick and mortar and to try and provide something other than that for low-income or 
affordable housing is akin to providing sub-standard housing.   
 
Since brick and mortar is the dominant building typology, it is no surprise that concrete 
is in high demand in the South African construction sector.  At the 2007 CBM-CI45 
International Workshop in Karachi, Pakistan, Dr. Yunus Ballim noted the following in 
regard to South Africa’s concrete industry:  "…the challenges facing the cement and 
concrete sector in South Africa are largely focused on its capacity for supply of 
materials (raw and processed) and development of high-level human resources skills… 
The country faces an increasing sophistication in the technology and application of 
cement-based materials that is becoming increasingly less tolerant of poor 
manufacturing practices. A strong base of high-level human resource skills will be 
necessary to maximize the benefits of these developments.” (Ballim 2007)  Dr. Ballim 
touches on a critical point that ties back into the need to improve the education 
                                                
45 CBM-CI: Cement Based Materials and Civil Infrastructure 
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system in South Africa – the pool of unskilled workers is voluminous but what this industry, 
and all other industries, needs are semi-skilled and skilled workers.  No matter how 
innovative the construction technology applied to a project, if it is poorly executed the 
result is still a sub-par product that will require future capital inputs to correct the issues. 
 
Understanding the history from which the ‘brick-and-mortar-only’ perception springs, 
but knowing forward progress is a necessity, the South African government and building 
industry professionals are forging ahead with programs and initiatives to encourage 
innovative construction methods and technologies, as well as promoting the 
promulgation of sustainably designed ‘green’ buildings. 
 
To that end, in 2007 the Green Building Council of South Africa (GBCSA) was formed as 
a non-profit to “lead the greening of South Africa’s built environment.” 
(www.gbcsa.org.za)  The GBCSA’s rating system is known as Green Star and is based on 
Australia’s Green Star rating system.  Similar to the LEED system in the United States, the 
Green Star system has tailored standards and criterion for different types of building 
uses, which currently include office, retail, multi-unit residential, public and education 
buildings.  There are others that are in development like interiors and existing buildings 
performance. (www.gbcsa.org.za)   
 
There are not yet any legislative mandates to adhere to prescriptive energy or ‘green’ 
design standards, but the Minister of Public Works, Geoff Doidge, recently made a 
public appeal for a greener built environment. (Cairns 2010)  By the end of 2012, South 
Africa had 30 Green Star rated buildings with two dozen projects in the application 
stage. 
 
Continued and increased encouragement from government at all levels to build 
‘green’ will go a long way toward stimulating interest and acceptance of green 
building with the potential of this burgeoning sector of the industry to be seen as “a 
nation-building opportunity, wherein jobs are created and gross domestic product is 
increased...” (Cairns 2010) 
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The national government is also working to encourage the use and acceptance of 
non-standard construction technologies via its agency, Agrément South Africa.  
Agrément SA’s stated objective, inter alia, is “facilitating the introduction, application 
and utilisation of satisfactory innovation and technology development…”  And is the 
“centre for the assessment and certification of innovative non-standardised 
construction products, systems, materials, components and processes, which are not 
fully covered by a South African Bureau of Standard standard or code of practice.” 
(http://www.agrement.co.za/) 
 
DENSITY 
The preponderance of low-density developments hinders the large-scale delivery of 
affordable housing units that are desperately needed.  Figure 5.4 is a 2012 density map 
for eThekwini that also illustrates a tendency toward the separation of economic uses 
and residential uses, which means it is unlikely that you live close to where you work. 
 
  
Durban 
FIGURE 5.4 
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There are many projects that can be classified as affordable (they contain units that 
are selling for no more than R500,000) that are not single-family homes, for example 
Fleurhof, Johannesburg, (Gauteng province), Walmer Links, Port Elizabeth (Eastern 
Cape province), and The Mews in Umhlanga, an up market suburb of Durban in KZN).46  
But even these typologies only increase vertical density up to five stories.  (See Photos) 
 
Cornubia a much-touted government sponsored development project that, when 
completed, will provide 24,000 housing units of which 15,000 will be for the poor (those 
eligible for a government subsidized home earning <R3,500 per month).  Based on the 
figures from the Cornubia website (http://www.cornubia.co.za/about-
cornubia/development-profile/) there will be 1.3 million square meters of ‘residential 
bulk’ on 620 hectare (or 14M s.f. on more than 1500 acres).  This translates to an overall 
FAR of less than one.47  A representative from the Developer was contacted for clarity 
and confirmation on these figures and, indeed, they confirmed that the subsidized 
housing had an average FAR of .4 while the residential areas considered to be high 
density had an FAR of 2.4.   
 
The eThekwini Housing Sector Plan 2012 begins to acknowledge the issue of low-density 
development and is incorporating minimum density standards and reassessing 
restrictions “pertaining to minimum plot sizes, maximum plot coverage, height 
restrictions, sub-division laws, building regulations, etc.”  But if “high density” is 
considered an FAR below three, then there is still quite a ways to go in the area of 
increasing densities to the point of delivering units in the quantities that are needed. 
 
                                                
46  Photos of Fleurhof and Walmer Links projects are from the photo gallery on the website of the 
Department of Human Settlements, South Africa.  Photo of The Mews is from International Housing Solutions 
at http://www.ihsinvestments.co.za/TheMews.aspx. 
47 The website notes the following figures:  1,200 ha total development with 80 ha for industrial and 500 ha 
for open space, wetlands, etc.  This leaves, at most, 620 ha for residential development.  The site also notes 
that there will be ‘1.3M square meters of residential bulk.’  By calculating FAR as total square meters of 
residential floor space divided by total square meters of land area, this comes to an FAR of less <1.  
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Images from selected affordable housing developments in South Africa. 
  
Walmer Links, Port Elizabeth 
The Mews, Umhlanga 
Fleurhof, Johannesburg 
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NATIONAL HOME BUILDERS REGISTRATION COUNCIL 
The website for the National Home Builders Registration Council (NHBRC), which was 
established in 1998, states that its mandate is “to protect the interests of housing 
consumers and to ensure compliance to regulated building industry standards.  In South 
Africa, anyone, individual or company, that builds homes must be registered with and 
certified by the NHBRC.  The website further state, “The NHBRC certifies builders who 
meet regulated industry criteria for technical, construction and financial capabilities.  
Your home enrolment with the NHBRC insures you against poor building practises. Our 
quality building inspections ensure that your home is not exposed to structural failure.” 
 
In its mandate to ensure against “poor building” practices and “structural failure” they 
are coming up short to the tune of billions of Rands. 
 
 Homes were being built of such poor quality that they had to be demolished and 
rebuilt. (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2010) 
 “Signs of waste and fraud are everywhere. Pipes that were supposed to bring 
clean drinking water to parched, impoverished communities were laid 
improperly and burst, requiring the whole job to be done again…” (Polgreen 
2012) 
 A major concern of the Department of Human Settlements was the significant 
number of housing units provided by the State that required repair because of 
shoddy construction.  The estimated cost of rectification was R20 billion. 
(Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2011) 
 “An inspector came to my site to inspect the foundations.  She showed up to a 
muddy site in heels and didn’t want to walk in the mud.  I pointed to the 
trenches where the foundations had been poured, but since it had been raining 
the day before, there was water on top of the concrete.  She said, “what’s 
that?” and I had to tell her that I was pointing at the foundations.  She should 
have walked over to confirm there was concrete under the water and not more 
mud.  She just said ‘OK’ and signed off on the inspection and left.  Shameful.” 
Interview with KZN developer who has a degree in engineering. 
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 “If you want to be registered with the NHBRC, you have to go down there and 
take a test that shows you understand the building regulations.  But the test has 
questions on it like, “if you have a 1-inch board and you’re nailing it to a 2-inch 
board, what length nail should you use?”  It’s ridiculous.  And if you fail the test, 
you can just go back the next day and take it again… the same test!  Same 
questions every time!  Just take it until you pass it.  It’s a joke.”  KZN home builder 
 
The money the State spends paying contractors for sub-standard houses and then 
tearing down those same houses negatively impacts the government’s ability to 
efficiently manage the budget allocation for housing subsidies, as well as hampers their 
ability to form strong public/private partnerships.  The government’s inability to maintain 
standards and ensure transparent processes discourages the private sector from 
partnering with public sector departments. 
 
THE TENDER48 PROCESS 
The national Department of Treasury has set up guidelines for all government offices 
regarding how and when to receive quotes and competitive bids.  If a project, VAT 
included, is less than R10,000, then multiple quotes and competitive bidding is not 
required.  For project values between R10,000 and R500,000, “government departments 
are required to invite and accept written quotes from registered prospective suppliers. 
For procurement above R500 000, they are required to invite competitive bids.” 
(Joubert 2012) 
 
eThekwini has established an online procurement system, Focused Procurement Lite or 
FP Lite, for viewing current requests for quotes and submitting quotes online.  The tender 
process has not yet been migrated to an electronic system, however current tenders 
are listed on www.govpage.co.za. 
 
The construction sector is home to some of the most rampant abuses in the real estate 
sector.  Inflated material pricing, collusion between bidding contractors, bypassing of 
                                                
48 What we in the States refer to as a “bid process,” South Africans call a “tender process.” 
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mandated tender procedures to award contracts to friends, political allies or relatives 
(regardless of qualifications), bribes for inspection sign-offs, and falsifying documents to 
receive payment for work not completed.  Many aspects of the construction industry 
seem to have been operating outside the law for decades. 
 
“The awarding of government tenders to connected individuals, which often…results in 
shoddy work, is one of the most common forms of corruption in South Africa.” (England 
2012)  The tender process is elaborate and tedious, and includes different committees 
to verify the tender specifications before they are released to the public, to scrutinize 
the tenders received and award projects based on a variety of factors: cost, expertise 
and experience, financial stability and capacity to name a few.  So with so many eyes 
on this process, how is it possible for so many contracts to be awarded to fraudulent or 
incompetent contractors?  The answer is something called “Section 36.” 
 
Section 36 is part of the Supply Chain Management regulation and allows for the 
bypassing of the standard tender process in emergencies.  KwaZulu-Natal, and 
specifically eThekwini, would appear to be rife with emergencies. 
 
An online news report in June 2013 estimated that Section 36 awards in eThekwini would 
top out at R2 billion by the end of the year.  According to the previous City Manager, 
Michael Sutcliffe, that is a fourfold increase in Section 36 awards since he left the office 
two years ago.  The Mayor, James Nxumalo and current City Manager, Sbu Sithole, say 
these awards were necessary and point to several large projects that fell under Section 
36 (drainage projects, housing completions and a court ordered settlement with a 
contractor). (Mbanjwa 2013) 
 
The Mayor also noted a new procedure by which all Section 36 awards have to be 
brought to the Executive Committee of the municipality before being awards, instead 
of being informed ex post.  The DA caucus leader said the Executive Committee is “just 
being used to rubber stamp decisions that are already taken.” (Mbanjwa 2013)  As 
such, the DA abstains from participating in the Executive Committees approval of 
Section 36 awards. 
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In regard to the issue of collusion, the South African Government News Agency posted 
an article on 24 June 2013 regarding a landmark corruption scandal in the construction 
industry: “The Competition Commission has reached a settlement with 15 construction 
firms, who have agreed to pay fines to the tune of R1.46 billion for collusive tendering… 
While over 300 instances of bid rigging were revealed through this initiative, the 
settlements were reached only with respect to projects that were concluded after 
September 2006, before which transgressions are beyond the prosecutorial reach of the 
Competition Act.” (South African Government News Agency 2013) 
 
Some of the projects these companies worked on included two stadiums related to The 
World Cup, Nelson Mandela Bridge and Soccer City in Johannesburg.  The contracts in 
question are estimated to be “worth more than R47 billion.  Around R28 billion of that 
amount came from public funds.” (Essop 2013)  The process by which more than a 
dozen major construction companies colluded in the price-fixing schemes is illustrated 
in the graphic, “10 steps to rigging a tender” on the following page. 
 
What happens to a contractor that was found to have been part of corrupt or 
fraudulent activities?  Or who was found to be lacking the requisite certifications or 
training to complete an awarded project?  Or any of the other major offenses that take 
place in this sector?  Some are blacklisted – their name and their company name are 
put on a national list so they can never again win a government tender.  Or can they?  
During a briefing by the SIU on fraud and corruption in the housing sector, the Deputy 
General of the DHS stated he “was concerned about issues revolving around the 
blacklisting of contractors… that sometimes when a contractor was blacklisted, that 
contractor could very easily just open up another company under a family member’s 
name.” (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2010) 
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REBUILDING THE CONSTRUCTION SECTOR 
“Public works contracts showed evidence that they had been manipulated, the 
Treasury Department said, to increase the cost of projects — and presumably the profits 
of the contractors.  Consulting fees ate up a quarter of the infrastructure budget.  Big 
contracts tended to go to a small handful of companies, many of them run by close 
associates of the province’s top politicians, according to provincial government 
documents.” (Polgreen 2012) 
FIGURE 5.5 
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A dichotomy exists in the construction sector – on the one hand there are strong and 
sincere efforts to innovate and build sustainably, and increased efforts into investigating 
and prosecuting corruptions, and on the other hand there is corruption that spreads 
wide and deep through both the public and private sector. 
 
The examination of this sector brings up many questions:  Are there creative multi-
stakeholder schemes that could be aimed at cross-incentivizing innovations in capacity 
building for supply of concrete, access to special financing and use of land in urban 
centers that have fallen into disrepair?  Can training programs be set up as joint 
ventures between the large concrete manufacturers and the local universities and 
colleges in order to train the “strong base of high-level human resource skills” that will 
be required to best leverage the new innovations in concrete technology and 
delivery?  How can public and private sector individuals be incentivized to not 
participate in corrupt and fraudulent practices? 
 
In Chapter 7, Corruption: An Unconventional Issue, I discuss different approaches to this 
complex and emotive issue. 
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6 | AFFORDABLE HOUSING FINANCE 
South Africa has a booming and well-regulated financial market.  The JSE, South 
Africa’s stock exchange, has 400 listed companies and as of November 2012, a market 
capitalization of USD $929 billion putting it in the top 20 exchanges in the world.  “The 
World Economic Forum ranks South Africa first out of 142 countries for its regulation of 
securities exchanges.” (England and Wallis 2012)  And for international and local 
investors in the property market the JSE, as of 1 April 2013, implemented a REIT structure 
that “is in line with international best practices” and has “a globally understood 
structure…” – and “once South African listed property funds convert to this system, 
South Africa will be the 8th largest REIT market.” (England and Wallis 2012) 
 
Combined impacts of the global financial crisis, the boom leading up to the World Cup 
and the prolonged Euro Zone crisis are evident in the ratios of mortgages to GDP and 
residential buildings to Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF)49 trends from the late 
1990’s to the end of 2012.  While the GFCF as a percent of GDP looks to be on a slight 
upward trend, residential buildings as a percent of GFCF are trending downward.  
                                                
49 Gross Fixed Capital Formation, as defined by the World Bank, includes land improvements (fences, 
ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, 
railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial 
and industrial buildings. 
FIGURE 6.1 
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HOW AFFORDABLE IS AN AFFORDABLE HOME? 
One of the many approaches the government has taken to address the economic 
inequalities the country faced after the end of apartheid was to institute a sweeping 
affirmative action plan, commonly known as ‘Triple B-Double E,’ or Broad-Based Black50 
Economic Empowerment (BBB-EE).  In South Africa, as here in the United States, this plan 
has staunch supporters and detractors.  The latter criticize the program saying it is 
causing a ‘brain drain’ by forcing qualified, skilled workers to go to another country for 
employment because they cannot get work in South Africa due to not qualifying as 
‘previously disadvantaged.’51  Proponents support the effort as a way to  
 
The crux of the issue in affordable housing finance can be understood by looking at a 
real-world, current example.  The restrictions in the fairly new Finance-Linked Individual 
Subsidy (FLISP) program from the government, compared to what the affordable 
housing market is spontaneously offering leaves the lower half of the gap market still in 
the gap.  The following are the eligibility requirements to qualify for the FLISP program: 
 
 The applicant must qualify for a mortgage 
 Applicant can never have owned another home 
 Applicant cannot have ever received any other government subsidy for housing 
 
If an applicant qualifies for the FLISP program, the subsidy can only be applied to the 
purchase of the following: 
 
 A new home 
 A home for sale in the secondary market 
 A home to be built on an already-owned and serviced plot of land (a building 
contract must be provided) 
 A vacant and serviced plot of land (the construction of the house would be the 
responsibility of the property owner) 
                                                
50 In this context the term ‘Black’ refers to Black Africans, Indians, Coloureds and Chinese. 
51 “Previously disadvantaged” is the term used to describe the populations that were oppressed under 
apartheid. 
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 The subsidy does not apply to sectional title transactions 
 The cost of any of the above qualifying properties cannot exceed R300,000, 
which is inclusive of VAT at 14%. 
 
The subsidy amount is determined on an income-based sliding scale, with those at the 
lower end of the income bracket (R3,500) receiving the maximum subsidy of R87,500, 
while those at the top end of the bracket (R15,000) receiving R10,050. 
 
Data from Census 201152 show that South Africans spent almost a third of their income 
(32.1%) on housing costs, which includes the cost of basic services (water, electricity, 
gas, etc.).  The chart below illustrates average percent of income expenditure for 12 
major categories: 
 
  
 
However, the Census 2011 data is not parsed further in order to distinguish the cost of 
                                                
52 Interestingly, the Census 2011 data did not provide a breakdown of expenditures based on income 
without the further parameter of race (See Appendix: Additional Demographic Information).  Therefore, 
there were no statistics provided to indicate, for example, what percent of income was spent on Transport 
by those earning <R3,500 per month regardless of race. 
FIGURE 6.2 
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electricity from rent.  In order to achieve a rough estimate of service cost separate from 
rent, data presented in a study conducted by the Department of Energy in 2012 was 
combined with Census 2011 data.  The Department of Energy study data concluded 
that for lower income populations a minimum threshold of 10% of household 
expenditure went toward electricity.  This figure was used to reduce the percentage of 
household income spent on housing.  The adjusted percentages, which are used in the 
ensuing budget scenarios illustrating access to financing by income level, are as 
follows:  
 
 Housing:  %22 
 Electricity:  10% (Molomo, Roberts, and Struwig 2012) 
 Transport:  17.1% 
 Miscellaneous, including medical and insurance costs:  14.7% 
 Food and non-alcoholic beverages:  13.9 
 All remaining expenses:  23.4% 
 
    
 
Using the average percent of income spent in major categories, the following 
“household budget scenarios” illustrate how those in the gap market continue to 
struggle to access financing, even with the FLISP subsidy. 
 
 
FIGURE 6.3 
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The following assumptions are used in the example that follows: 
 
 2% has been added to the current prime rate of 8.5% to account for borrowers 
that have minor infractions in regard to their credit history 
 R300,000 has been used as the maximum value of a home, including VAT, to stay 
in line with the requirements of the FLISP subsidy. 
o VAT in South Africa is 14%, which means the home cannot cost more than 
~R263,000 
o Assume property is in move-in condition and requires no further capital 
outlay for repairs 
o Additional scenarios are run using a lower home value, but a search of 
property listings in the Durban metro area indicates that little to nothing is 
available below R200,000, excluding VAT 
 Subsidy amount has been changed based on sliding scale.   
o R3,500 monthly income receives R87,500 in subsidy funding 
o R7,500 monthly income receives R60,000 in subsidy funding 
o R15,000 monthly income receives R10,050 
 
Expense Category Income and Expenditures/Mo (Rands) 
  3,500 7,500 15,000 
Housing  770   1,650   3,300  
Electricity  350   750   1,500  
Food  448   960   1,920  
Transport  599   1,283   2,565  
Misc, incl medical costs & insurance  515   1,103   2,205  
Everything Else  819   1,755   3,510  
 
Monthly Income  R3,500  
Amount of Subsidy  87,500   87,500   60,000  
Amount of Mortgage (Rands)  212,500   77,000   105,000  
Total Cost of House (incl VAT)  300,000   164,500   165,000  
Interest Rate (Monthly) 0.9% 0.9% 0.5% 
Repayment Period (Months) 240 240 240 
MONTHLY PAYMENT ($2,121.56) ($768.75) ($767.47) 
  
TABLE 6.1 
TABLE 6.2 
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Monthly Income  R7,500  
Amount of Subsidy  60,000   60,000   60,000  
Amount of Mortgage (Rands)  240,000   165,000   227,000  
Total Cost of House (incl VAT)  300,000   225,000   287,000  
Interest Rate (Monthly) 0.9% 0.9% 0.5% 
Repayment Period (Months) 240 240 240 
MONTHLY PAYMENT ($2,396.11) ($1,647.33) ($1,659.21) 
 
Monthly Income  R15,000  
Amount of Subsidy  10,050  
Amount of Mortgage (Rands)  289,950  
Total Cost of House (incl VAT)  300,000  
Interest Rate (Monthly) 0.9% 
Repayment Period (Months) 240 
MONTHLY PAYMENT ($2,894.80) 
 
We can see that the lower income range cannot take advantage of the FLISP subsidy 
unless the price of the home with VAT is no more than R190,000, and the middle income 
bracket can only take advantage of the subsidy if a home is found that is less than the 
R300,000 cap, VAT included.  It is clear that the FLISP program works best for those that 
are at the very top end of the income continuum for the gap market. 
 
A further scenario was run to test at what interest rate the program would work for 
populations in the R3,500 and R7,500 income groups.  Highlighted in green is the interest 
rate at which the program becomes affordable to these two groups, which is 6% per 
year (including the estimated 2% add-on for moderate credit risk).  This means the Prime 
Rate would need to be more than halved from 8.5% to 4% in order to make the 
numbers work.  The assumption that a mere 2% margin for credit risk is likely just as 
unrealistic as halving the loan rate given that 9.53 million “credit-active” consumers had 
“impaired credit records” in the first quarter of 2013.” (Coastal Roy 2013) 
 
These conclusions are illustrated in Figure 6.4, which clearly indicates the bulk of 
mortgages issued are going to those at the higher end of the affordable market 
income group. 
 
TABLE 6.3 
TABLE 6.4 
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Even so, there is much excitement around a new “affordable housing” development 
going into a highly sought after up-market area of Durban called Umhlanga.  Many of 
these units are, by government definitions, affordable because they are priced at 
R500,000 or less.  However, the least expensive unit in this development sells for R450,000.  
So that means this entire development is disqualified from being considered in the FLISP 
program.53 
 
THE GOOD NEWS IN FINANCE 
Increased efforts to create access to affordable financing further down market are 
clearly in order.  South Africa’s economic ties to the Euro Zone mean that it is negatively 
impacted by the global recession more than other African countries and, as such, the 
banks have maintained a tight grip on issuing debt, especially to the more risky 
affordable market borrowers.  But whereas the previous two market drivers’ obstacles 
we have thus far discussed – land and construction – are also rife with corruption, the 
                                                
53 As of the writing of this thesis, the application process for the FLISP subsidy had been closed because the 
number of applications received exceeded the budget allocation.  The application process will not reopen 
until April of 2014. 
FIGURE 6.4 
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finance sector is not quite so.  This makes sense due to the high level of international 
and internal scrutiny that is placed on South Africa’s financial system. 
 
One such group of requirements to which South Africa’s financial institutions adhere is 
contained in Basel III.  The new Basel III requirements “introduced a global liquidity 
standard and compels banks all over the world to institute higher liquidity levels to 
safeguard against liquidity disruptions.” (Nyandoro 2012)  South African banks are 
already hesitant to issue debt to an untested and, what is seen as, a risky market and 
the tentative pipeline of finance to the gap market has a significant chance of 
constricting further with the impending implementation of the Basel III requirements.54   
In order to meet the new standards, South African banks will incur increased costs in 
acquiring additional liquid assets as well as a significant upgrade in technology in order 
to meet reporting requirements of liquidity and stress testing. 
 
Faced with the realities of Basel III requirements, South Africa’s financial institutions have 
also signed on to do their part to create more access for the ‘unbanked’55 population, 
as well as drill further down into the gap market in terms of mortgage lending.  The 
Financial Sector Charter is a voluntary charter signed by the country’s largest financial 
institutions, including the JSE, and was borne out of the BBB-EE Act. The Charter is 
primarily concerned with fostering greater equity in the sector and providing accessible 
financial products that meet the needs of lower income consumers. With regard to 
housing finance the sector committed to originating R42 billion in the FSC target market 
between January 2004 and December 2008. The FSC target market was defined as 
households with an income of between R1,500 and R7,500 measured in 2004 Rands 
indexed to CPI.  
 
                                                
54 Basel III is a “global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy, stress testing and market liquidity risk 
agreed upon by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III requirements were mainly 
introduced to ensure that banking systems are more resilient to shocks in the market.” (Nyandoro 2012) 
55 Unbanked groups are those that do not use banking institutions in any way.  As of July 2013, an estimated 
67% of South Africans were considered unbanked. (Yurcan 2013) 
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FILLING THE GAP IN AFFORDABLE HOUSING FINANCE 
Not having to contend with corruption is a bright spot in the struggle to create 
financing solutions for the affordable housing market.  South Africa’s leaders quickly 
realized at least one crippling limitation of FLISP – that it only applied to newly 
constructed homes.  To address this shortcoming, the national government took steps to 
make the FLISP program more accessible by opening up qualified purchases to include 
properties sold in the secondary market, as well as vacant serviced land (as long as 
there is a contract in place to build a home, which is not included in the subsidy).  
However, this is still not enough to reach the mid- to lower-end of the affordable market 
income spectrum.  The cap on home value needs to be raised above the current 
R300,000 and consideration should be given to setting a variable cap based on 
regional market prices for homes instead of a nationally applicable home value. 
 
The national government also recognizes that there is considerable reluctance to 
extend credit further down into the affordable housing market due to higher risks 
associated with this group.  To compensate for this risk, the government is currently 
setting up Mortgage Default Insurance Company (MDIC), which will be capitalized with 
R1 billion of government funds.  The MDIC was initially slated to come online late 
2012/early 2013, but based on stress testing of its original business model and additional 
recommendations by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) the business model was 
revamped.  The government, PwC and the four largest financial institutions in South 
Africa – ABSA, First National Bank, Standard Bank and Nedbank – are working together 
to ensure the long-term viability of the MDIC when it finally does roll out. 
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7 | AN UNCONVENTIONAL ISSUE: CORRUPTION 
“The Washington research group, Global Financial Integrity said in a report 
that South Africa had suffered an illegal outflow of R185-billion due to 
corruption in both the public and private sectors between 1994 and 
2008.” (Corruption Watch 2013)  
 
“Graft and wasteful spending have sapped the government’s ability to 
tackle inequality.  Only three of 39 government departments were 
pronounced clean in audits by South Africa’s Auditor General last year, 
and only seven of 237 cities passed muster the year before.” (Polgreen 
2012)  
 
“Britain announced this week it is ending development aid to South Africa 
in 2015. British aid this year amounts to $29.5 million — slightly more than 
the government has spent on Zuma's private residence.” (“Report: South 
Africa Losing Battle Against Corruption” 2013)  
 
“National Treasury is currently scrutinizing 76 business entities with contracts 
worth R8.4 billion which we believe have infringed the procurement rules, 
while SARS is currently auditing more than 300 business entities and 
scrutinizing another 700 entities.” (“Budget Speech 2013” 2013)  
 
In reviewing the land, construction and financing sectors in regard to their influence on 
the slow delivery of affordable housing, we can see that there are clearly issues within 
each sector that must be addressed.  Most schemes or reforms have been focused on 
either the financing side of housing or land reform, which tends almost exclusively to 
mean rural land reform.  While financing and land reform are critical elements of 
stimulating a robust market in the affordable housing sub-sector, they seem to function 
in a semi-vacuum.  And, to date, there have been no policies or initiatives focusing on 
increasing the supply of affordable housing projects by incentivizing innovations in 
building technologies or the overall construction process, which could reduce costs, 
increase efficiencies and make affordable housing delivery more attractive to 
developers. 
 
In the land market, the government’s program of redistribution would be tremendously 
helped by a shift in the scale of the land transfers.  The common practice is to take 
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large parcels of land and transfer it to large groups of beneficiaries.  Most of the 
beneficiaries have neither the skill nor the desire to run large-scale commercial farming 
enterprises, and so the land becomes non-productive and the economic state of the 
beneficiaries is hardly improved, if at all.  There are rare cases where the transferring 
owner (typically a white South African) will work with the new beneficiaries to transfer 
skills to aid in successfully maintaining the farm operations.  More often than not, 
however, the transferring owner will take the payment for the land and, as far as that 
particular farm is concerned, walk away feeling at best conflicted (they’ve worked the 
land for decades but know their ancestors came to own the land by taking it from 
indigenous inhabitants of South Africa) and at worst angry (they weren’t the ones that 
took the land and they’re the ones that have worked it for most of their lives).  This is an 
understandable human response. 
 
THE CONSEQUENCE OF A POINTILLISM VIEW OF CORRUPTION 
There is one issue that weaves through these reforms, through the development 
process, indeed through politics and the overall economy – corruption.  This is not news.  
In fact, corruption of all manner and kind is reported on a regular basis on talk radio 
shows, online media outlets, in newspapers and on televised news broadcasts.   
 
If you’ve ever looked at a pointillist painting up close, you see the dots but they’re just 
dots.  Step back a bit and maybe you discern the shape of a tree or a house.  Step 
back further yet and, aha!, all of those individual dots have coalesced into a full 
landscape with trees, houses, cars, schools, children, etc.  What does this have to do 
with corruption in South Africa?  Discrete instances of corrupt activity in land 
transactions, education, health services or awarding of tenders – these are reported 
with numbing regularity.  This is standing up close and seeing just the random dots.  Take 
a step back and we have instances such as was noted in Chapter 5 regarding 
corruption in the construction sector.  Many dots of corrupt activity came together in a 
collusive scheme to fix contract awards worth billions of Rands.  This is the tree that can 
be seen while the rest of the landscape is still obscured.  What is seen when one takes a 
giant step back?  What is the landscape of South Africa’s economy when all of the 
dots, from all of the sectors, come together to form a panoramic view?  From this 
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vantage point, the impact of corruption can be seen everywhere from the stifling 
impact it has on economic growth, the way it hinders better educating the populous, 
providing healthcare, undermines political stability, erodes trust and stokes the fires of 
division, as well as constraining foreign investment in South Africa – all of which impacts 
the affordable housing market by deterring developers (severely reduced profit 
margins), constricts access to financing to the gap market (stricter underwriting terms 
due to perceived increased risk), and high unemployment and reduced labor mobility, 
(keeps potential buyers out of the affordable housing market). 
 
After delivering a lecture at the University of Johannesburg in April of this year, Pravin 
Gordhan, Minister of Finance was speaking with reporters and said, “Corruption is now 
becoming a social phenomenon. …It (corruption) is becoming a cultural problem in 
South Africa…” (South African Press Association 2013b)  The issue of corruption is one 
fraught with emotion for all South Africans with each person’s view of it filtered through 
a myriad of personal experience, family history, livelihood, and political or professional 
affiliations.  Pointing the finger at one group or person and saying “remove 
them/him/her” and the issue of corruption will be solved, is simplistic.  Corruption is not 
the singular purview of only one political party, or one race, or one sector (public or 
private) of the economy.  The truth is that corruption is a dance that requires at least 
two participants, and it matters not their race, gender, political affiliations or education 
level.  Insofar as it is possible, approaching the issue of corruption objectively is, in the 
author’s view, most effective.  Understanding this is easier said than done, and the 
author has attempted to do just that, at least within the realm of housing development.  
 
THERE ARE THREE SIDES TO EVERY STORY… 
In the process of researching the affordable housing market, the seemingly unchecked 
prevalence of corruption kept coming up as one the most significant drivers of cost and 
uncertainty in the market.  What also became clear within the respondent group was 
that there were, for the most part, two camps when it came to the question of how to 
deal with corruption.  On the one hand, there were those I interviewed that felt 
eradicating corruption was the only way to move forward as a society and as a way to 
improve the economy and the lives of all South Africans.  And on the other hand, there 
 94 
were those that believed corruption could never be eliminated and so the prudent 
approach was to find a way to, for lack of a better word, accept it and figure out how 
to work with it as an inherent part of “the system.” 
 
These two approaches brought to mind the well known quote by Robert Evans, which 
says, “There are three sides to every story: your side, my side and the truth.  And no one 
is lying…”.  The spirit of this quote – that between two perceptions of a situation lays the 
truth of both – is used as the basis of the ensuing analysis where three ‘sides,’ or 
proposed approaches, to the problem of corruption are discussed.  For the purpose of 
the analysis, “your side” and “my side” have been changed to reflect the two primary 
themes of the respondents – “reluctant acceptance” and 
“eradication” – and “the truth” is presented as the author’s 
position on how to approach the issue of corruption. 
 
RELUCTANT ACCEPTANCE 
Corruption as an Issue of Double Marginalization 
The concept of double marginalization shows that with a 
minimum of two vertical monopolies, end-product prices 
are higher and profits for all in the vertical chain are lower.  
Let’s look at this by using the Rhine River, during the Holy 
Roman Empire, as an analogy of corruption in the housing 
sector in South Africa. 
 
If we think of the Rhine River during the time of the Holy 
Roman Empire and understand that a ship traversing the 
Rhine had to pay a toll to each castle along the way in 
order to pass, and each castle was operating 
independently of all other castles without knowledge 
and/or consideration of what the other castles were 
charging for a toll, then each castle was, in fact, a 
monopoly.  This example equates quite nicely to the 
development process and, for this example, the official 
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approvals that must be obtained at various stages of a development project in order to 
reach completion.  Each official whose job it is to provide approval is akin to a toll-
exacting castle, operating independently of all other officials and without consideration 
to market forces.   
 
In the course of delivering a housing project, a developer needs signatures from various 
inspectors to approve the foundations, water systems, fire and safety systems, electrical, 
etc.  Each approval can be considered a monopoly with the potential to require a ‘fee 
for passage,’ or a ‘facilitation fee’ as developers that were interviewed called them.  
The amount of this fee is not known until it is levied and is not coordinated with any of 
the other ‘toll takers,’ and is thus contributing to the effect of double marginalization.   
 
Consider the developer of an affordable housing project, whose product is affordable 
housing, as a “retailer,” and the individual inspectors providing inspection approvals as 
“wholesalers.”  Figure 7.1 shows the profit-maximizing price and output production for a 
single monopoly retailer (developer) whose inputs (inspections) come from a 
competitive market.  The grey-shaded area of deadweight loss indicates demand that 
the retailer is unwilling to meet because doing so would require lowering prices, which 
would reduce profits.  Figure 7.2 illustrates the changes that take place when there is a 
double monopoly.  The inputs are no longer competitively priced, prices increase, 
output decreases and overall profit is reduced, while deadweight losses are 
dramatically increased.   
 
 
FIGURE 7.1 FIGURE 7.2 
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In a development project where a string of approvals are required to achieve a 
Certificate of Occupancy there is the potential for multiple input monopolies, and it is 
reasonable to extrapolate the double marginalization effect and see how corruption 
increases the cost of housing, reduces the production of housing, increases 
deadweight loss and simultaneously reduces the corrupt officials potential personal 
profit.  
 
In economic terms, the best way to attack the issue of double marginalization in 
housing development, short of removing all monopolies completely, is to consolidate 
the monopolies into as few as possible monopolies, preferably a single monopoly.   
 
How can we apply this theory to the assessing of ‘facilitation fees’ in the development 
process in South Africa?  By applying the same solution:  consolidate the monopolies 
into a single entity.  In plain terms, create a position of “Facilitation Manager” within 
each district whose job it is to levy a single ‘facilitation fee’ against each development 
project.  The Facilitation Manager will have the responsibility of distributing the fee 
among the previously independently functioning monopolies – the inspectors. 
 
In order to reduce the uncertainty of development costs, and as a way to ensure more 
affordable housing projects are completed, the ‘facilitation fee’ can be calculated on 
a sliding scale based on the target market of the project.  Up-market developments will 
pay a higher facilitation fee than mid-market projects, and affordable housing projects 
will pay a much lower fee.  In this way, there is a cross-subsidizing effect that both 
enables and encourages development across target markets. 
 
Centralizing and organizing corruption in this manner removes the uncertainty and risk 
of unknown fees in the approval process that can strip profit margins or prevent projects 
from getting off the ground altogether.  The centralization process of facilitation fees will 
subsequently provide a level of transparency in the development process that will 
promote market competitiveness between districts.  Market inefficiencies will not be 
eliminated, but it is reasonable to project that fees charged will trend toward 
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oscillations around an equilibrium point instead of unpredictable fees at suspected, but 
unknown, points in the development process. 
 
ERADICATION 
The seeming omnipresence of corruption in South Africa, and the decades of 
lackadaisical enforcement of consequences, belies efforts to uncover and 
systematically root out corruption in South Africa.  In 2012 the Basel Institute on 
Governance – International Centre for Asset Recovery issued a report titled “South 
Africa Anti-Corruption Architecture.”  It listed 19 different coordination units (5) and 
commissions (14) at the national level that are tasked, in one way or another to prevent, 
investigate and/or prosecute cases of corruption and fraud.  A few of these units are 
noted below: 
 
The Public Protector: The Public Protector is an independent institution established under 
the Constitution (Section 182).  It receives reports from anyone who has a complaint of 
corruption that involves government departments, agencies or officials.  Any criminal 
cases are referred to the Hawks. 
 
Hawks (SAPS):  An elite investigation unit that is part of the South African Police Service.  
Cases of corruption that involve criminal offenses are reported at any police station 
and are then handed over to the Hawks for investigation. 
 
Special Investigations Unit:  The SIU’s “primary mandate is to recover and prevent 
financial losses to the state caused by acts of corruption, fraud and maladministration.” 
(www.siu.org.za)  It is a public entity, which investigates and can take civil action 
against those under investigation and/or convicted of corruption including the seizure 
of assets and compelling perpetrators to pay back any wrongfully obtained financial 
gains.  The SIU also works with relevant departments to cancel contracts that were 
obtained outside of mandated procedures. 
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Highlights from a 2010 presentation by the SIU to the DHS: (Gaesale 2010) 
 In 2010 the SIU completed investigations into more than 4,400 cases of fraud or 
corruption in the housing sector from 2006 (cases had been handed off to it by 
the Auditor-General).  The SIU found sufficient evidence to proceed on 2,162 
cases. 
 In the same year it completed investigations into 5,440 cases of fraud or 
corruption in the housing sector from 2008 and found sufficient evidence to 
proceed against 1,632 cases. 
 Between 2006 – 2012 found almost 15,000 ineligible government employees had 
placed themselves on the list to receive a government-subsidized home. 
 
If an investigation uncovers criminal activity, the SIU refers the matter to the Hawks, who 
operate as an elite investigative unit of the South African Police Service. 
 
Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU):  The AFU functions as part of the National Prosecuting 
Authority and focuses on the seizure of criminal’s assets especially as it relates to 
organized crime. 
• In KZN, the AFU and the Hawks have seized or frozen an estimated R140 million in 
assets of Ms. Shawn Mpisane on charges of corruption in regard to tenders and 
inflated procurement invoices.  This is estimated to be one of the largest cases of 
the AFU, who is working closely with the Hawks on the case. 
 
Anti-Corruption Task Team Anti (ACTT):  The ACTT is an advisory commission that derives 
its powers from its members, who come from the SIU, AFU, the Hawks, SAPS and the 
National Prosecuting Authority (NPA).  The ACTT’s current goal is to ensure the 
“prosecution of at least 100 persons by 2014, who have accumulated at least ZAR 5 
million through illicit means.” (Pereira et al. 2012, 54) 
 Joint operations, as of 2012, have resulted in 116 accused persons appearing in 
court in relation to 42 cases with R579 million in frozen or seized assets. 
 The ACTT investigates cases involving its own member organizations – it is 
currently investigating the procurement department of the SAPS 
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 The ACTT has investigations underway in the Department of Rural Development 
and Land Reform in regard to contracts awarded to build low-income housing 
and abuses in the housing subsidy programs. (Radebe 2011)  
 
The Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster (a cluster of national ministries) 
investigated its member ministries as well, resulting in 362 cases being investigated and 
arrests of 167 public officials and 124 private citizens, which have resulted in 155 
convictions so far. (Ibid.) 
 
High profile investigations and prosecutions are becoming more common, which is a 
hopeful sign in the push to deter and ultimately eradicate corruption.  However, there 
are, at least, two things that would enhance these efforts: 
 A single national entity, or policy, whose mission is to coordinate the efforts of the 
19 various organizations responsible for some form of anti-corruption activities, 
and to provide training for public sector employees on the prevention of 
corruption (Ibid., 90) 
 A more robust protection system for whistle-blowers, who many times are putting 
their lives in danger if they report corruption 
 
BETWEEN RELUCTANT ACCEPTANCE AND ERADICATION:  POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
Full disclosure… at the outset of this research, I was rooting for ‘team eradication.’  Over 
the course of this study it has become clear that the best way to reduce corruption to 
the point where it becomes the exception and not the rule is to employ tactics that 
embrace the pragmatism of working within the current system while continuing all 
available avenues toward eradication. 
 
The author proposes that the workable solution to the issue of corruption lies between 
the quest for complete eradication and reluctant acceptance of corruption.  Efforts 
underway to eradicate corruption should continue along with increased consistency in 
enforcement of consequences for engaging in corrupt activities, and could be 
enhanced by the points noted in the previous section.  But eradication efforts can be 
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bolstered and made more effective with the acknowledgement that corruption will 
likely persist in some manner no matter how vigorous is the effort of eradication. 
 
Combining a sustained effort to eliminate corruption with consistently applied impactful 
consequences, both in the public and private sectors, along with reducing corruption’s 
impact on the delivery of affordable housing by implementing consolidation efforts 
noted in the discussion of corruption as a problem of double marginalization, is a more 
viable approach to addressing the economic and moral quagmire caused by today’s 
rampant corruption. 
 
Concurrent to this dual approach on the issue of corruption should be new and cross-
sector initiatives that address the cost of land, construction and financing In order to 
increase the supply of much-needed affordable housing in well-located areas.  The 
following are suggested areas of further research into their potential feasibility as cross-
sector initiatives: 
 Discounted financing costs and tax incentives for affordable housing projects in 
urban areas where the development incorporates adaptive reuse of existing 
buildings, or energy efficient building envelopes/mechanical equipment, or 
innovative construction technologies; 
 Fast-Track of projects for companies that agree to, and fund, annual audits by 
reputable third-parties to ensure best practices and reduce instances of 
corruption; 
 Tax incentives or Fast-Track status for established developers or construction 
companies that partner with emerging developers/contractors on affordable 
housing in order to increase skills and capacity for future projects; 
 Preference for projects built at much higher densities than is current practice, 
with tax breaks to buyers or renters to incentivize the adaptation of living in 
higher densities; 
 A national position akin to an Affordable Housing Director who is tasked with 
ensuring projects are fast-tracked, especially in urban areas where the project is 
a mixed-use and mixed-income development; 
 101 
o This position would also oversee the implementation of District Facilitation 
Managers as a way to ensure top-down centralization of existing 
corruption and the reduction of too many ‘toll takers’ at the point of 
intersection between public official and developer. As Olken and Barron 
(2009) state, “…tackling corruption at the top of an organization could 
actually lead to increases in bribes if the number of bribe takers on the 
ground remains the same…” 
 Scaling up the model used in the Port Elizabeth Land and Community 
Restoration Association – aggregating urban land claims, identifying abandoned 
or dilapidated buildings for purchase or expropriation (if necessary) in urban 
areas and implementing diverse stakeholder working groups, with third party 
expertise for planning and engagement, to create economically sustainable 
urban communities that are socio-economically integrated, and; 
 Proactive governmental efforts to create transparent public-private partnerships 
focused on affordable housing delivery and integration of mixed-uses in the 
urban core. 
 
The provision of housing for lower income populations in South Africa is profoundly 
complex and will require a multi-faceted approach to the issue of corruption and 
innovative thinking and risk-taking on the part of the government and the private sector 
in executing higher density projects that take advantage of underutilized properties in 
the urban core.  
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8 | SUMMARY 
This thesis looked at four major drivers contributing to the extreme supply shortfall of 
affordable housing in South Africa:  land reform, the construction sector, financing and 
corruption.  Land, construction and financing can be considered conventional cost 
drivers to development, while corruption is an unconventional driver.  Through publicly 
available information and anecdotal evidence provided during interviews, the author 
sought to present an understanding of how and where corruption appears in the 
housing development process.  Rigorous quantitative calculations on the impact of 
corruption are difficult, and sometimes dangerous, to produce.  Qualitative indices 
point to the possibility of corruption accounting for up to a 30% loss in spending power 
for local governments due to the private sector inflating costs or colluding on contract 
bids.  And there is the unquantifiable cost of projects that never get started because 
the uncertainty of corruption costs makes them too risky to pursue. 
 
The prevalence of corruption, in both public and private sectors, is evidence that the 
consequences of being caught are not sufficient to prevent corrupt or fraudulent 
behavior.  The economies of corruption, as discussed in Chapter 7, Corruption as an 
Issue of Double Marginalization, have not been acknowledged and this, in turn, is 
severely hindering the government and the open market from meeting the 
overwhelming demand for affordable housing.  By not addressing corruption in a 
systematic way of combined eradication and efficient incorporation methods, the 
government is getting in its own way and failing in its Constitutional obligations, namely:  
 Every citizen has the right to… reside anywhere in, the Republic (Section 21.3) 
 Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. (Section 26.1) 
 
Although the interviews I conducted were semi-structured, there were two questions 
that were posed to each respondent.  The first was, “What do you think needs to 
happen to meet housing needs in South Africa?”  Surprisingly, there were almost 
exclusively three answers: 
 Massive political upheaval 
 Revolt or uprising by the poor 
 I just don’t know… the problem doesn’t seem solvable 
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In regard to the first of these responses, my second question was, “With so many 
corruption cases allegedly involving public figures, up to and including President Zuma, 
why do politicians that are perceived to be corrupt continue to be re-elected?”  
Respondents replied that a vote [by Black South Africans] for any party opposing the 
ANC was a vote against Black South Africans, “like putting a knife in the heart of your 
own people” said one respondent; and a vote for the DA [by anyone other than a 
White South African] was a vote for putting Whites back into power.  This play by 
politicians on the racial differences in South Africa started long ago.  “Apartheid 
president PW Botha regularly tried to silence his and the National Party’s detractors by 
labeling them ‘communists.’  Former president Thabo Mbeki likewise called all critics of 
the ANC under his leadership ‘racists.’  Zuma, too, when he has come under fire on 
legitimate grounds, has cried that such criticism is ‘un-African.’” (Mazibuko 2013)56 
 
The potential solutions presented in this paper require political will and a level of 
integrity that seems to be fluid where it needs to be solid.  And while massive political 
upheaval is not likely, the numbers of those moving away from the ANC into existing or 
newly created opposition parties is on the rise.  It is unlikely that the ANC will come 
away with 65% of the vote in 2014 and this may well be because “…a new generation 
of South Africans will vote next year – those born after the first democratic election in 
1994 who have less emotional attachment to the ANC and its liberation credentials…” 
(Pretoria 2013) 
 
Increasing the supply of affordable housing in metropolitan areas may be an effective 
tool in promoting upward income mobility, which circles back to improving lower 
income populations’ ability to enter the housing market.  A new study conducted in the 
United States, which has some applicability in South Africa based on similar spatial-
income divisions, concluded that “geography can hinder upward mobility. 
…researchers identified four broad factors that appeared to affect income mobility, 
including the size and dispersion of the local middle class. All else being equal, upward 
mobility tended to be higher in metropolitan areas where poor families were more 
                                                
56 It should be noted that Lindiwe Mazibuko, the author of the column in which these quotes appeared is 
the Parliamentary leader of the Democratic Alliance, which is the ANC’s official political opposition.   
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dispersed among mixed-income neighborhoods.” (Leonhardt 2013)  One of the cities 
used in this study was Atlanta, Georgia, which is distinguished by it’s sprawling, low-
density housing outside of the CBD and deep spatial divides that run along income 
lines.  eThekwini and, more broadly, KwaZulu-Natal, share these characteristics and it 
bears further research into whether the findings in this US-based study could be more 
directly applied to the urban planning initiatives already being considered that address 
these very spatial dislocation issues in South Africa. 
 
Based on information presented in this paper, it is clear that in order to make 
meaningful progress toward meeting the staggering current and anticipated future 
demand of affordable housing units, an “all hands on deck” effort is required by the 
government – national, provincial and local – as well as the private sector in the efforts 
to materially reduce the incidence and impact of corruption and to create innovative 
cross-sector incentives and initiatives to reduce costs and stimulate development. 
 
“Corruption is not an issue that can be tackled with one solution, but 40.” (Professor 
Albert Saiz 2013)  The same is true of the affordable housing supply shortage and the 
many factors that feed into this industry.  In “Potential Solutions,” the author is providing 
ideas that can become the basis for further consideration and research. 
  
 105 
APPENDICES 
SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT: FULL LIST OF DEPARTMENTS AND MINISTERS IN CABINET57 
 
                                                
57 This table is available at http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/dept.htm with live links to each department. 
Position Department(s) Minister Deputy Minister(s)
President of South Africa - Jacob Zuma -
Deputy President of South Africa - Kgalema Motlanthe -
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries
Tina Joemat-Peterson Pieter Mulder
Arts and Culture Arts and Culture Paul Mashatile Joe Phaahla
Basic Education Basic Education Angie Motshekga Enver Surty
Communications Communications Dina Pule Thembisa Stella Ndabeni
Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs
Cooperative Governance 
and Traditional Affairs
Richard Baloyi Yunus Carrim
Correctional Services Correctional Services S'bu Ndebele Ngoako Ramathlodi
Defence and Military Veterans Defence, Military Veterans Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula Thabang Makwetla
Economic Development Economic Development Ebrahim Patel Hlengiwe Mkhize
Energy Energy Dipuo Peters Barbara Thompson
Finance Treasury, Stats SA Pravin Gordhan Nhlanhla Nene
Health Health Aaron Motsoaledi Gwen Ramokgopa
Higher Education and Training
Higher Education and 
Training
Blade Nzimande Mduduzi Manana
Home Affairs Home Affairs Naledi Pandor Fatima Chohan
Human Settlements Human Settlements Tokyo Sexwale Zou Kota
International Relations and 
Cooperation
International Relations and 
Cooperation
Maite Nkoana-Mashabane
Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, 
Marius Fransman
Justice and Constitutional 
Development
Justice and Constitutional 
Development
Jeff Radebe Andries Nel
Labour Labour Mildred Oliphant
Mineral Resources Mineral Resources Susan Shabangu Godfrey Oliphant
Police Police, ICD Nathi Mthethwa Makhotso Sotyu
Public Enterprises Public Enterprises Malusi Gigaba Gratitude Magwanishe
Public Service and 
Administration
Public Service and 
Administration, PSC, 
PALAMA
Lindiwe Sisulu Ayanda Dlodlo
Public Works Public Works Thembelani Nxesi Jeremy Cronin
Rural Development and
Land Reform
Rural Development and 
Land Reform
Gugile Nkwinti Lechesa Tsenoli
Science and Technology Science and Technology Derek Hanekom
Social Development Social Development Bathabile Dlamini Maria Ntuli
Sport and Recreation Sport and Recreation Fikile Mbalula Gert Oosthuizen
State Security State Security Agency Siyabonga Cwele
Minister in the Presidency for the 
National Planning Commission
National Planning 
Commission
Trevor Manuel
Minister in the Presidency for 
Performance Monitoring and 
Evaluation as well as 
Administration in the Presidency
The Presidency, GCIS Collins Chabane Obed Bapela
Tourism Tourism Marthinus van Schalkwyk Thozile Xasa
Trade and Industry Trade and Industry Rob Davies
Thandi Tobias, Elizabeth 
Thabethe
Transport Transport Ben Martins Sindiswe Chikunga
Water and Environmental Affairs
Water Affairs, Environmental 
Affairs
Edna Molewa Rejoice Mabhudafhasi
Women, Youth, Children and 
People with Disabilities
Women, Youth, Children and 
People with Disabilities
Lulu Xingwana Hendrietta Bogopane-Zulu
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
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STRUCTURE OF SOUTH AFRICAN COURTS 
     
    Original chart available at www.paralegaladvice.org.za 
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EXPANDED CHRONOLOGY FROM “THE RISE AND FALL OF APARTHEID”   
(Clark and Worger 2011, xiii–xvii) 
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IMAGES OF AN AFFORDABLE HOUSING PROJECT: CORNUBIA, KWAZULU-NATAL 
 
 
  
Phase 1: Construction of government-subsidized homes. These homes 
will be given to those earning <R3,500 per month. Due to restrictions 
within the current program, these homes must be freehold title – 
sectional titling is prohibited, which keeps density low. 
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Exterior and interior images of the low-
density, government-subsidized homes 
that will be given to qualified low-
income households.   
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